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WHAT CONSTITUTES A
RELIGIOUS USE FOR
ZONING PURPOSES
ROBERT S. WALKER*

The attempt to determine what constitutes a "religious use" for the
purpose of municipal or state zoning law applications' may involve a vari* B.S., Dyke College, 1979.

A singular, acceptable definition of what constitutes a "religious use" apparently does not
exist. Rather, the nature of a religious use will depend on the standards established by each
jurisdiction. As a result, the term has been both "'broadly extended to conduct with a religious purpose,'" Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 316, 319
N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971) (quoting 67 N.Y. JUR. Zoning and Planning Laws § 198 (1969)), and narrowly interpreted to mean "churches in the usual and
traditional sense," Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). In
support of its broad view, the New York Court of Appeals has stated:
A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the opportunity to worship
God. Strictly religious uses and activities are more than prayer and sacrifice and all
churches recognize that the area of their responsibility is broader than leading the
congregation in prayer....
To limit a church to being merely a house of prayer and
sacrifice would, in a large degree, be depriving the church of the opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and strengthening itself and the congregation.
Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 453, 136 N.E.2d 488, 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15,
21-22 (1956). See generally Berry, Judicial Definition of Religious Use in Zoning Cases,
1973 URn. L. ANN. 291.
It has been noted that religious uses are favored as a matter of public policy. "The
courts repeatedly emphasize the high purpose and moral value of religious institutions. The
contribution of religious use to the public welfare is regarded as beyond discussion or dispute ......
2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.18, at 442 (2d ed. 1976); see
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 524, 136 N.E.2d 827, 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d
849, 861 (1956); 44 FORDHAM L. R.v. 1245, 1247 (1976). It is axiomatic that in order to
properly serve the congregation members, property for a religious use must be conveniently
situated. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra, at 443; cf. West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 24 Ohio
Misc. 66, 75, 261 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Ct. C.P. 1969) (exclusion of religious institutions from
residential areas "would result in imposing a burden on the free right to worship and could
conceivably result in prohibiting altogether the exercise of that right"); 44 FORDHAM L. Ray.
1245, 1254 (1976) (free exercise infringed upon when church is forced to locate twelve miles
from members or in an undeveloped location of the city). Therefore, the potential traffic,
noise, litter and tax revenue loss problems commonly associated with religious uses, must be
balanced against their positive contribution to the community. See Diocese of Rochester v.
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ety of considerations, often implicating constitutional issues.2 Complicating the task of assessing the permissibility of a proposed religious use are
the conflicting mandates of two distinct facets of the American constitutional framework: the rights of religious entities to the free exercise of

their religion as guaranteed by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution

3and

the regulatory powers of states to ensure and protect

Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d at 524-26, 136 N.E.2d at 835-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62; 2 R. ANDERSON,

supra, at 444.

The free exercise clause of the first amendment often has operated to limit the extent to
which zoning enactments may impinge upon the activities of religious organizations. Synod
of Chesapeake Inc. v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611, 613-14 (Del. Ch. 1969); Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 574, 448 P.2d 185, 188 (1968); Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 287, 342
N.E.2d 534, 537, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 752 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976); Diocese of
Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 524, 136 N.E.2d 827, 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 861
(1956); Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 453, 136 N.E.2d 448, 453, 154
N.Y.S.2d 15, 21 (1956); American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pius v. Schwab, 68 App. Div.
2d 646, 649, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (2d Dep't 1979).
' The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof ....
" U.S.
CONSr. amend. I. Applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the free exercise clause has been described by the
Supreme Court as securing "religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority," School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
The right to the free exercise of one's religion was recognized as a fundamental right in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1962). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218
(1972). Although no dispute in which a zoning ordinance was challenged on free exercise
grounds has come to the Supreme Court, the Court has dismissed an appeal in such a case
for want of a substantial federal question. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 338 U.S. 805, 805
(1949). The free exercise clause developed later than the free speech aspects of the first
amendment. Indeed, one commentator has stated:
In every case in which a claim under the free exercise clause was upheld, it was
bracketed with a free speech or free press claim; conversely, whenever free exercise
stood alone it was unsuccessful. Realistically, free exercise did not have a separate
but equal existence, or even one that was separate and unequal; it practically had no
existence at all.
Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GRo. L.J. 1115, 1130 (1973) (citations omitted).
The first break with this approach occurred in the Supreme Court case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963). See Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for
the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 327. Previously, "the free exercise clause
[had been considered] vestigial and superfluous . . . ." d. at 326. Although the future
course of the Supreme Court is uncertain, id. at 345; Pfeffer, supra, at 1142, the application
of the free exercise clause has broadened, see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See also Pepper, supra, at 328-29.
One of the most significant cases in this area is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
One commentator has stated that the importance of Yoder is that the Court "accorded not
merely parity but supremacy to free exercise." Pfeffer, supra, at 1140. Furthermore, Yoder
also indicates that Sherbert was not an isolated decision, since Yoder reaffirmed Sherbert's
'
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their residents' health, welfare, safety, and morals. 4
These potentially conflicting interests have evolved throughout the
years as two separate constitutional doctrines. Thus, there may often exist a tension between the states' right to implement a particular pattern
of zoning and the first amendment's guarantee of religious freedom.' The
purpose of this Article is to discuss and identify these potentially conflicting doctrines, hopefully reconciling the two bodies of law within the crucible of available constitutional precedent. Further, this discussion will propose a workable constitutional approach which will be repugnant to
neither the states' zoning power nor the first amendment's free exercise
guarantees.
STATE ZONING LAWS AND RELIGIOUS

USES-THE IssUE

States often are confronted with the difficulty of resolving conflicts
between the exercise of their broad police powers and the free exercise
claims of religious entities. The resolution of these conflicts, however,
may have the effect of restricting the scope of religious practices. The
following hypothetical will serve to illustrate the tension between the
states' zoning power and the guarantees of the free exercise clause. Sup"compelling interest balancing test," 406 U.S. at 230.
4 It is well settled that a state may regulate the use of property within its borders through
zoning enactments. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 370 (1926); see Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 71 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 8, 9 (1974); Lewis v. District of Columbia, 190 F.2d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See
generally 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 1-1 (4th ed. 1978). Zoning laws and
other enactments typically contemplate the separation of a specified territory into smaller
districts with only legislatively permitted uses allowed in each subdivision. Id. The basis for
the exercise of such authority is the so-called police power of the states. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Sinclair Rev. Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 F.2d 214, 21617 (7th Cir. 1949); 5 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 34.0111], at 34-2 (1981); 1
E. YOKLEy, supra, § 1-1. Based upon the pronouncements of the Court in Euclid, there grew
a presumption of constitutionality for any zoning ordinance enacted to further a legitimate
state interest. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). Subsequently,
however, the requirement that there be a "legitimate" state interest in the challenged legislation was qualified. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court
recognized the existence of a "fundamental family right" and determined that a zoning ordinance, limiting occupancy of a dwelling unit to single families and recognizing only a few
restricted categories of related persons as constituting a "family," was unconstitutional. In
striking down the ordinance, the Court noted that a case involving fundamental family
rights, required "careful examination" of the governmental interest advanced. In the case at
bar, such an examination disclosed a "tenuous" relationship between the ordinance and the
asserted state purpose. Id. at 500. Thus, it appears that zoning laws which impinge upon a
fundamental right will be subjected to a strict scrutiny standard of review rather than the
minimally comprehensive rational basis test generally applied to zoning ordinances.
' See note 2 supra.

27 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1982
pose that the tenets of a religious sect specifically require the practice of a
certain vital ritual or activity for which the purchase or erection of a certain type of appurtenant structure is necessary. Suppose further that
before the building is erected, there arises a question as to whether the
particular structure is violative of the applicable zoning laws, which permit only residential uses and structures qualifying as "churches." The
sect then requests a building permit, which is denied. The denial is thereafter appealed to the local zoning board of appeals, which determines,
based upon its own interpretation of the definition of "church," that the
sect's proposed use is nonqualifying and therefore impermissible. The
sect then seeks judicial review of the zoning board's determination. The
propriety of the board's decision, however, is assessed through application
of the rational basis inquiry, under which it is held that the considerations of traffic congestion, noise, parking and other general welfare criteria relied upon by the board were sufficient to overbalance the sect's desire to erect the structure. The initial denial of the building permit is
therefore affirmed. The sect is thus foreclosed from both erection of the
structure and the practice of an activity intimately related to its religious
mission.
In the foregoing illustration, the sect's fundamental right to the free
exercise of religion was effectively impaired without consideration of first
amendment questions. Despite the fact that free exercise rights are
clearly implicated in many zoning disputes in which religious organizations are involved, zoning authorities and tribunals frequently fall to assess the exercise of the zoning authority in terms of its infringement upon
religious rights. This failure to perceive the constitutional dimensions of
zoning decisions which limit the activities of religious organizations raises
the following questions. May municipal zoning authorities, wielding a
highly restrictive component of the state police power, summarily prohibit the erection of religious facilities and be virtually immune from the
constitutional constraints and strict scrutiny imposed upon other types of
state regulation affecting religious exercise? Further, do the procedures
followed and considerations assessed by local zoning authorities in their
determinations afford religious organizations the full benefit of their free
exercise rights as guaranteed by the first amendment? Before attempting
to answer these questions, it should prove beneficial to examine briefly
both the free exercise clause and the state's power to zone. Initially, however, a brief summary of the various zoning devices commonly encountered in zoning disputes will be provided.
Zoning Devices-Some General Considerations
Comprehensive zoning plans enacted by a municipality separate various segments of a city into land use districts in order to "[accomodate]
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the whole complex of land uses."' Flexibility is often built into the plan
through various zoning techniques including special permits, exceptions,
and conditional use permits. Special use permits involve a municipality's
adopting standards for administrative review, on a case-by-case basis, of
petitions for special uses permitted by the comprehensive plan. If a special permit is granted, only minimal injury to surrounding property presumably will result.7 The special permit may be granted subject to conditions decreed by the reviewing board. For example, if a zoning plan, on its
face, did not allow churches in a given zoning district, a church would
apply for a special use permit and the application would be reviewed by
the local zoning board to determine whether the existing land uses will be
injured by the proposed new use. The board might then make the granting of the permit contingent upon various conditions which would protect
the adjacent landowners' property, such as requiring a church to stipulate
that no services will be held before a specified hour.
A zoning plan may provide for the situation in which a single rule
applicable to a large number of land parcels imposes unnecessary hardship upon a particular landowner. An administrative official or board
may, therefore, relieve that hardship by allowing an exception to the land
use regulation. s Conditional-use zoning plans are devices which permit
1 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9.17, at 129; 5 P. ROHAN, supra note 4, § 37.01, at 37-2. See
generally E. YOKLEY, supra note 4, § 5-2; Tondro, Euclidian Zoning and Special Permits:
Problems In Connecticut's Land Use Regulation Law, 52 CONN. B.J. 167, 172-76 (1978).
Comprehensive zoning plans ensure that a landowner is not faced with arbitrary restrictions
on the use of his land and also promote the general welfare of the community. E.g., Udell v.
Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 894 (1968). While the
exact definition of comprehensive zoning is unclear, see id. at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 895, the term generally envisions a plan that has been carefully considered and
strikes a reasonable balance among the various needs of the community. See E. YoKLzY,
supra note 4, § 5-3.
7 See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9.18, at 134. A special permit differs from a variance
in that it is required for uses which are permitted by the zoning regulations, while a variance is a grant of authorization for a use which is expressly prohibited by the zoning plan. 3
R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 19.02. Another distinguishing aspect of a special permit is that
"the applicant need not make any showing of unusual hardship." Note, The Use and Abuse
of the Special Permit in Zoning Law, 35 BROOKLvN L. REV. 258, 260 (1960).
The use of special permits allows for centralized control over standards governing permitted uses. This approach, if properly administered, should sufficiently protect the needs
of the user and the surrounding community. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 4, § 44.01[4], at 44-14.
In contrast, it has been noted that this device unfairly burdens the landowners, "by requiring them to resort to administrative proceedings to vindicate their right to use their lands."
2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9.18, at 134.
0 See Capital Properties, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 255, 258 (D.D.C. 1964);
Berlant v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. 583, 586-87, 279 A.2d 400, 401-02 (Commw.
Ct. 1971); R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9.20. See generally 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING § 1 (4th ed. 1979); 3 E. YoKLzy, supra note 4, § 20-1. A special exception differs from a variance in the same manner as does the special permit. See note 6
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uses of property not included in the particular land use area. In such a

situation, the landowner will often agree to restrictions which are not applicable to all parcels similarly classified. The excepted parcel is usually
rezoned at a later date to include the new use. Conditional-use permits
are similar to special-use permits in that the same criteria for issuance
are applied. Further, each could result in a landowner's undertaking additional restrictions which would not apply to the remainder of the land
parcels in the zoning district. Notwithstanding these similarities, conditional uses differ from other variance devices in that there occurs a rezoning of the parcel after a conditional use is granted.'
A variance is administrative permission to depart from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance.10 Although the question of what constitutes a religious use may arise in a number of contexts,"1 the restriction of
religious uses through a variance may involve the troublesome problem of
supra. The zoning ordinance actually establishes certain exceptions and it is left to the zoning board merely to determine whether the factual situation presented meets the specified
conditions. Syosset Holding Corp. v. Schlimm, 15 Misc. 2d 10, 11, 159 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89-90
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956), modified, 4 App. Div. 2d 766, 164 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't
1957); Township of Haverford v. Spica, 16 Pa. Commw. 326, 330, 328 A.2d 878, 880
(Commw. Ct. 1974).
See Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 417-18, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872,
876-77 (Ct. App. 1979); 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9.20; C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY AND
TACTIcs IN MUNICIPAL ZONING 196-97 (2d ed. 1979). One court has stated that "conditional
zoning properly understood involves only an adopted zoning ordinance which provides either: (1) The rezoning becomes effective immediately with an automatic repealer if specified
conditions are not met within a set time limit, or (2) the zoning becomes effective only upon
the conditions being met within the time limit." State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.
2d 22, 30, 174 N.W.2d 533, 538 (1970).
" See, e.g., C. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 35. The purpose of a variance is to allow the
landowner relief from the strict terms of the zoning ordinance so that he can enjoy the full
use of his land. E.g., Clerics of St. Viator, Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 320 A.2d 291, 294 (D.C. 1974); 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 18.02. Unlike other
zoning devices which are granted for the limited protection of the present landowner, a
variance runs with the land and thus passes to subsequent owners of the parcel. E.g., Balodis v. Fallwood Park Homes, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 936, 939, 283 N.Y.S.2d 497, 501 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1967); Fox v. Shriver-Allison Co., 28 Ohio App. 2d 175, 181, 275 N.E.2d 637,
641 (Ct. App. 1971); 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 18.02.
" See note 1 supra. The necessity of defining "religious use" occurs not only in cases
wherein the applicable zoning ordinance expressly allows for such uses, but also in cases
where the proposed use may be categorized as an "accessory use." See Sexton v. Bates, 17
N.J. Super. 246, 258, 85 A.2d 833, 839 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951), afl'd sub noma. Sexton v.
Essex County Ritualarium, 21 N.J. Super. 329, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952). A
permissible accessory use has been defined as one that is "'customary with and incidental
to' the permitted use," 2 E. YoKLY, supra note 4, § 8-2, at 2 (footnote omitted) (quoting In
re Emmett S. Hickman Co., 49 Del. 13, 19, 108 A.2d 667, 670 (1954)), and which is located
"on the same lot as the principal use," 2 E. YoKLzv, supra note 4, § 8-3, at 4. In Sexton,
however, the New Jersey court held that a ritualarium was neither a church nor an accessory use. 17 N.J. Super. at 258-59, 85 A.2d at 839.
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defining a religious use. Such a procedure differs from the case in which
the zoning ordinance contains an express allowance for a church and its
appurtenant practices.12 In most cases, an administrative board is called
upon to decide whether a variance will be granted or denied." However,
the criteria often examined by zoning authorities in making such a decision, such as the diminution in property values of adjoining land parcels,
potential noise or traffic generated by the use, and the maintenance of the
"character" of the neighborhood, may be suspect guidelines when a religious use is at stake. Although religious uses, as one commentator has
observed, "may be subjected to reasonable regulation. . . the usual criteria of reasonableness do not necessarily apply when the regulated use is
"14
religious ....
"' See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 12.25-.26, at 459-60. When the zoning plan includes
churches in the range of permitted uses, the question of granting the use permit is framed in
terms of whether the activity contemplated falls within the definition of a "church" rather
than a "religious use." Compare Twin-City Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 50 Ill.
App. 3d 924, 927-28, 365 N.E.2d 1381, 1384 (App. Ct. 1977) (classes, meetings and study
groups are permitted uses under city ordinances providing exceptions for churches) and
City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church, 118 N.H. 56, 60, 382 A.2d 377, 380
(1978) (parochial school included in the meaning of "church") with Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J.
Super. 246, 259, 85 A.2d 833, 839 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951) (mikvah is not a church), aff'd
sub nom. Sexton v. Essex County Ritualarium, 21 N.J. Super. 329, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1952) and Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (healing center is not a church). It has been noted that "not ... every place in which religious
services are conducted is a church." Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich.
693, 700, 29 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1947).
'3 See C. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 35-36; Comment, Variance Law in New York: An
Examination and Proposal, 44 ALB. L. REV. 781, 784-86 (1980). While state views differ on
the extent to which a variance should be allowed, see Note, Zoning-Modificationof Zoning
Ordinance Use Restrictions, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 522, 524-26 (1975-1976), most often a landowner must prove hardship and that the variance, if granted, will not permit a use which is
contrary to the general welfare of the public. See, e.g., Township of Haverford v. Spica, 16
Pa. Commw. 326, 330, 328 A.2d 878, 880-81 (Commw. Ct. 1974).
4 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 12.20, at 450; see Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown,
22 N.Y.2d 488, 496, 239 N.E.2d 891, 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 303-04 (1968); terlant v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. 583, 586-87, 279 A.2d 400, 402 (Commw. Ct. 1971). In Brown,
the court remarked:
We have said that religious structures cannot be excluded, directly or indirectly,
from residential zones. We have said that factors such as potential traffic hazards,
effects on property values and noise and decreased enjoyment of neighboring properties cannot justify the exclusion of such structures.
Religious structures enjoy a constitutionally protected status which severely curtails the permissible extent of governmental regulation in the name of police powers
....
[W]here an irreconcilable conflict exists between the right to erect a religious
structure and the potential hazards of traffic or diminution in value, the latter must
yield to the former.
22 N.Y.2d at 496-97, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04. But see Christian Retreat
Center v. Board of County Comm'rs, 28 Or. App. 673, 680-81, 560 P.2d 1100, 1103-04 (Ct.
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When a zoning plan is enacted, the municipal legislative body has

already made a decision with respect to what the optimum land use is in
the various sectors delineated by the plan. A petitioning religious institution, however, may still be in the preferred position of being able to defeat the comprehensive nature of the plan by invoking the rights guaran-

teed by the free exercise clause of the first amendment. The definition of
a religious use and the standard of review to be applied are crucial issues
both in a variance context and when religious uses are expressly permitted. The framing of the issue, it is submitted, should be the only difference in approaching both situations.
Rights and Limitations-The Free Exercise of Religion
In Reynolds v. United States,1 the Supreme Court indicated that
one's religious beliefs may not justify the committing of an overt criminal

act." Notably, the Reynolds Court observed that while "laws cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. '17 Thus, constraints were imposed on religious actors, displaying

the Court's determination that there exist definite limits to the application of the free exercise clause, notwithstanding that an accepted doctrine
of a sect imposes a duty upon the practitioner to engage in particular
conduct. 18 In Reynolds, the Court examined the historical conception of
polygamy in order to determine whether the practice was contemplated
by the framers as a religious act protected by the free exercise clause. The
Court concluded that the religious activity in question had always been

considered "odious" by civilized societies and thus could not have been
App. 1977) (proposed use would adversely affect the surrounding area).
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 166-67. In Reynolds, a member of the Mormon Church was charged with and convicted of bigamy in violation of Utah's criminal statute. Id. at 146. During his trial, the
evidence showed that the defendant knew that his valid former marriage precluded a lawful
second marriage while his first wife was still living. Id. at 167. Nevertheless, he claimed, as
justification for his unlawful conduct, his religious beliefs required that he take more than
one wife. Id. at 161. Additionally, he proved that the Mormon Church performed the ceremony pursuant to its doctrines. Id. The Reynolds Court, however, declined to exempt from
criminal liability those persons who practice polygamy as part of their religious doctrine. Id.
at 166-67.
" Id. at 166.
," Id. at 166-67. The Reynolds Court, in determining that the Mormon practice was not
protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment, expounded upon the distinction between religious belief and action. Id. at 166. The Court observed that religious belief
may not be proscribed, but that laws may operate to impinge upon religious practices. Id.
Thus, the Court determined that the protection accorded by the free exercise clause is limited and does not extend to protect conduct violative of social duties or "subversive of good
order." Id. at 164. See generally R. CUSHMAN, CiviL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES: A
GUIDE TO CURRENT PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCE 92 (1956).
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intended as a protected religious practice." Similarly, in Prince v. Massa-

chusetts,20 the Supreme Court upheld a statute which had made it a
crime for a girl under 18 to sell newspapers and periodicals publicly, despite the fact that the religion of the girl required that this practice be
performed.21 In another early case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"2 the re-

spondent challenged the Compulsory Education Act adopted by the state
of Oregon which required parents and guardians to send their children
(between the ages of 8 and 16) to public schools or face a misdemeanor
charge.2 8 In order to sustain preliminary orders restraining the petitioner

from enforcing the Act,' 4 the Court relied on a fourteenth amendment

due process argument, holding that the Act unreasonably interfered with

the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the education of their children.25 The practical effect of Pierce was to ensure that parents enjoyed
1998 U.S. at 162-63. The Court initially undertook an analysis of the intention of the framers in enacting the first amendment and its guarantees of religious freedom, in order to
accurately interpret the word "religion." The Court then assessed the extent to which the
government may proscribe activities undertaken for religious reasons. Id. The Court indicated that almost all religious expressions will be protected against state action except those
which are in opposition to social duties. Id. at 164. Thereafter, the Court examined the
practice of polygamy and observed that it had always been considered an offense against
society. Id. at 165. The Court concluded, therefore, that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was not intended to embrace polygamy. See id. Additionally, the Court found
the statute justified by the state's legitimate secular purpose of perpetuating monogamous
marriages. Id. at 165.
20

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

1 Id. at 166.
22 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
" Id. at 530 & n.*. In Pierce, the plaintiffs were a public corporation owning and conducting, for profit, private religious schools and a private corporation owning and conducting, for profit, private preparatory and military training schools. Id. at 531-33. Notably,
the corporations were granted standing to assert the substantive due process liberty rights
of parents. Id. at 534-35. The corporation sought to enjoin enforcement of a statute which
would have made parents criminally liable for declining to send their children to public
schools. Indeed, once the statute was determined to be an improper exercise of the state's
power, the corporations were granted standing to claim protection of their property rights.
Id. at 535-36. The corporations urged that enforcement of the statute would deprive them of
patronage, since parents would be required to remove their children from the private
schools operated by the corporations and send the children to public school. Id. at 532, 53536. In striking down the state law, the Court observed that the "inevitable practical result of
enforcing the Act under consideration would be destruction of [the plaintiffs') primary
schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools ....
" Id. at 534.
'1 Id. at 529-30. The Pierce Court noted that the Compulsory Education Act required
"every parent, guardian or other person having control or custody of a child" to send the
child to a public school. Id. at 530.
" Id. at 534-35. While recognizing the state's legitimate interest in requiring all children to
attend school, the Pierce Court stressed that such interest must be balanced against the
liberty interest of parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control." Id. Consequently, the Court found that the liberty interest of the parents could
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the right to substitute a sectarian education for that offered by public
authorities. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,2e the power of the state to regu-

late religiously based conduct was limited to the attainment of a permissible end through the exercise of authority which does not "unduly...
infringe" upon a protected freedom."7 The Supreme Court in Cantwell
reversed convictions of three Jehovah's Witnesses for violating, inter alia,
Connecticut's statute prohibiting solicitation of money for religious or
charitable causes without the approval of the secretary of public welfare.28 In striking down the Connecticut statute, the Court observed that
the "determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to
lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution."' 9 The Court cautioned, however, that although the freedom to
believe was absolute, the freedom to act was not,s 0 and noted that "conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."''
not be encumbered by legislation "which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State." Id. at 535. The Court then concluded that the parents "who
nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right... to prepare (the child] for additional obligations." Id.
s 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'7

Id. at 304.

Id. at 301-02. The appellants, Jehovah's Witnesses, as a result of certain activities, angered neighborhood Catholics. Id. at 303. Consequently, the appellants were charged with a
common-law breach of peace. Id. Additionally, they were charged with violating the state
statute prohibiting solicitation of money for religious causes without prior approval of local
officials. Pursuant to the statute, these officials were required to determine whether the religious cause of the solicitor (Jehovah's Witnesses) was that of a "recognized" religion and
were empowered to issue a certificate based upon such affirmative finding. Id. at 302.
" Id. at 307. Initially, the Court remarked that the free exercise of religion is embraced by
the "fundamental concept of liberty embodied" in the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 303.
The Court then stated that the statute was facially invalid, by virtue of the delegation of
discretionary power to the licensor, as a form of prior restraint. Id. at 305-06. Significantly,
where a law authorizes a system of prior licensing, the Supreme Court has consistently required a statutory delegation to be narrowly drawn, reasonable, and to provide definite standards for the officials to follow. See generally Blasi, PriorRestraintson Demonstrations,68
MICH. L. Rav. 1481, 1486-89 (1970).
Additionally, the Cantwell Court overturned the appellant's conviction for the common-law breach of peace. The Court reasoned that the communication, although it stirred
animosity, did not pose a "clear and present danger" of threat to public safety or peace. 310
U.S. at 311.
" 310 U.S. at 303-04.
31 Id. at 304. The Cantwell Court observed that the state may regulate conduct of a religious practitioner pursuant to its police powers. Id. Accordingly, the state may constitutionally regulate the time, place and manner of religious solicitation despite the free exercise
guarantees, and may safeguard the public against fraudulent solicitation. Id. at 305. The
method chosen by the state in Cantwell, however, whereby complete discretion is given to
the licensor in order to effectuate these legitimate goals, unconstitutionally burdened the
free exercise of religion as protected by the first amendment. Further, the Court suggested
that the state must utilize the least drastic means of preventing fraud. Id. at 306. The state
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2 the SuIn West Virginia State Board of Education v.Barnette,"
preme Court held that state action compelling school children to salute
the flag on pain of expulsion from public school was contrary to the first
and fourteenth amendments when applied to those students whose religious beliefs forbade saluting the flag.38 The Court observed that the salute required an affirmation of a belief and a state-inspired mental attitude.Y Thus it was determined that a law requiring conduct which
evidenced belief in a particular doctrine infringed upon freedoms protected by the first amendment.8 ' One year after Barnette, United States
v. Ballard" was decided. Ballard dealt with a mail fraud conviction under
the United States Criminal Code for promotion of the "I am" movement
through the use of the mails.37 Notably, in Ballard the Court emphasized
the absolute right to believe in a particular religious doctrine, free from
state scrutiny, by rejecting the contention that the truth or falsity of the

may, however, impose criminal sanctions upon the citizen who fraudulently solicits, or, as an
alternative to the screening process struck down in Cantwell, require some form of identification or proof of authority to act prior to the solicitation in public. Id. at 306-07.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
's Id. at 642. In Barnette, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses challenged a school regulation,
requiring public school students to salute the American flag, as a violation of their religious
convictions. Id. at 629. The regulation, in effect, conditioned public education upon the
compulsory flag salute. The salute was required as a means of instilling patriotism and promoting national unity. Id. at 626. Significantly, Justice Jackson, in holding that school children could not be required to join in a flag salute, stated that compelling students to salute
on pain of dismissal represented an impermissible shortcut to a legitimate state interest. Id.
at 631, 634.
£4 Id. at 631-33. The Court examined the question of whether the state had the power to
make the salute a legal duty. The Court observed that "officially disciplined uniformity," id.
at 637, and "compulsory unification of opinion," id. at 641, would lead to a disappointing
end; id. The school regulation was especially unacceptable to the Court since the affirmation
of belief occurred within an institution dedicated to educating the young. Id. at 637.
" Id. at 642. Justice Jackson stated that the issue concerning compulsory flag salutes did
not "turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they
are held." Id. at 634. The Court concluded, therefore, that the "sphere of intellect and
spirit" is secure from the control of the government, and found the state requirement, compelling a flag salute and pledge in public schools, unconstitutional. Id. at 642.
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
*7 Id. at 79. The defendants in Ballard had solicited money based upon their representations that they were "divine messengers" and that they had the power to heal all diseases.
Id. at 79-80. As a result, they were indicted for using the mails to intentionally defraud the
public by knowingly, making false and fraudulent statements. Id. at 80. The defendants
objected, on free exercise grounds, based upon the fact that the representations were sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at 80-81. Notably, the trial court submitted to the jury the
issue of the defendants' "honesty and good faith belief," but did not submit to the jury the
question as to the truth of the religious beliefs acted upon. Id. at 81. The defendants, nevertheless, were convicted. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding that inquiry
should also be made into truthfulness. Id. at 85.
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respondent's religious beliefs could properly be submitted to a jury." The
rights of free speech and religious expression were also examined by the
Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama.8 9 In Marsh, the freedom to distribute leaflets in a privately owned town was upheld against the application of an Alabama trespass statute in a proceeding initiated by the owner of the quasi-public property. 0 Since the town was the only public
forum, though privately owned, the trespass statute as applied was

deemed unconstitutional."
The Supreme Court, in Braunfeld v. Brown,4' held that a statute eftId. at 86. In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, Justice Douglas observed that
no judge or jury had the competence to determine whether the religious experiences claimed
by the defendants had in fact occurred. Id. at 86-87. The Court observed that "[f]reedom of
thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men." Id. at
86. Additionally, the Court noted that government must tolerate conflicting religious views.
Id. at 87. Moreover, it is implicit in the Court's affirmance of the district court's charges to
the jury that the sincerity of a practitioner's beliefs could be examined in a prosecution for
fraud arising out of faith-healing claims. Id. at 84. Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion,
however, indicated his belief that sincerity was an issue beyond the scope of the Court's
power to explore. Id. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See generally Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection: "Religion in the Law," 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964).
" 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
40 Id. at 502-03. In Marsh, the "company town" was a privately owned area encompassing
both residential and commercial districts. Id. at 502. The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation
owned and governed this area but it had no official connection to any governmental entity.
Id. Agents of the corporation had ordered a Jehovah's Witness to leave the privately owned
business district and to cease the distribution of religious leaflets within the borders of the
company town. Id. at 503-04.
While many commentators believe that the Marsh case is the most liberal example of
the use of the public function doctrine, Professor Tribe takes the position that the case, on
its own terms, was not truly a public function decision. L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1165 (1978). The public function concept was formulated in response to the increased
delegation of state functions to private actors. Id. at 1163. This trend prompted the Court to
emphasize that when private persons assume the role of the state by performing government
functions, they subject themselves to the same limitations as would be applied to the state
itself. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
37-43 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41 326 U.S. at 504. It is apparent that the corporation in Marsh would have violated the first
amendment if it were a municipality of the state attempting to impinge upon the exercise of
free speech. Id. at 504-05. Thus, the central question concerned the applicability of the first
and fourteenth amendments to the actions of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Id. at 504.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black held that the corporate town was indeed bound by
the guarantees set forth in the first and fourteenth amendments and that the individual
thus had a right to disseminate the religious literature. Id. at 508-10.
More specifically, the Court stressed the fact that the state allowed private ownership
of land to an extent which allowed this corporation to replace all of the functions which
would normally belong to a municipality. Id. at 506. The Court reasoned, therefore, that
because the private business area served as the functional equivalent of a shopping area in a
regular city, the first amendment was applicable. Id. at 500.
" 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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acted to achieve a legitimate, secular state end which did not compel a
choice between religious practice and criminal penalty was valid, notwithstanding that an indirect burden on religious exercise rights resulted.43 In
Braunfeld, the appellants, Orthodox Jews, were Philadelphia merchants
who engaged in the retail sale of clothing and home furnishings." The
appellants' faith required that they abstain from all manner of work from
nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday." When a Pennsylvania statute' was enacted proscribing the Sunday sale of certain commodities, including those sold by appellants, the appellants instituted a suit in
which they sought a permanent injunction against enforcement of the
statute.' 7 In their complaint, the appellants alleged that the Sunday closing law would render it impossible for them to observe their religion and
continue in business, thereby constituting a violation of both the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.'"
Chief Justice Warren, writing for a plurality of the Court, recognized
in his discussion of the free exercise clause that the Court had long held
that "[c]ertain aspects of religious exercise cannot in any way be restricted or burdened by either federal or state legislation."" The Chief
Justice further observed, however, that the Court also had held that the
"freedom to act. . . is not totally free from legislative restrictions.' 50 The
Court distinguished appellants' situation from others in which religious
practitioners were compelled to choose between adherence to a religious
,' Id. at 606. Chief Justice Warren was joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Whittaker. Id.
at 600. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred, while Justice Douglas dissented. Justices
Brennan and Stewart dissented in part, reasoning that the statute constituted a violation of
the petitioner's free exercise rights. Id. at 614.
" Id. at 601.
46

Id.

"

Id. at 600 n.1.

'

Id. at 601.

Id. The plurality stated that the equal protection and establishment clause questions
raised by the appellants had previously been answered in the negative in Braunfeld's companion case, Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961). The plurality thus narrowed the question
presented to whether the statute unconstitutionally burdened the free exercise of religion.
Id.
'
Id. at 603. Chief Justice Warren noted that "[c]ompulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship is strictly forbidden. The freedom to hold
religious beliefs and opinions is absolute." Id. (citations omitted).
' Id. The plurality opined that while opinion is beyond the constitutional reach of legislation, religiously motivated action may be subject to restraint by countervailing public interests. Id. at 603-05. In this regard, the plurality examined Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) (sustaining conviction of Mormon whose "duty" it was to practice polygamy) and
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding statute prohibiting sale in public
place by girl under age of 18 despite her religous "duty" to do so).
"
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belief and imposition of criminal penalties. The Court stated:
But, again, this is not the case before us because the statute at bar does not
make unlawful any religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply
regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to
make the practice of their religious belief more expensive."
Chief Justice Warren then concluded that the statute was constitutional
both on its face and as applied to appellants. s Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it compelled the appellants to choose between their business and adherence to
their religious practices. 5s He initially observed that the Court had incorrectly emphasized the state's collective goal of ensuring a day of rest instead of carefully considering the preservation of personal liberties as embodied in the first and fourteenth amendments." ' Further, Justice
Brennan noted that the constitutional standard to be applied when a
statute conflicts with the free exercise clause should not be one which
requires only a rational relation between the challenged law and some
legitimate legislative end. ss Justice Brennan concluded, therefore, that
since no "compelling" or "overbalancing need" had been displayed to justify the indirect, but substantial impairment of appellants' freedom of
worship, the statute violated appellants' right to the free exercise of
religion."'
The Supreme Court's landmark free exercise decision, Sherbert v.
Verner,'7 significantly increased the extent to which the rights of religious
practitioners are protected from state infringement. As one commentator
opined, "the Court departed from prior decisions, which had limited state
action which constituted direct burdens on religion, and expanded the
scope of free exercise activities to include indirect burdens."' " In Sher366 U.S. at 605. The plurality distinguished between those laws which directly bear upon
the exercise of religion and those that impact indirectly, reasoning that strict scrutiny of
those which bear indirectly "would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Id. at 606.
8sId. at 609. The plurality discussed the appellants' suggested alternative to the Pennsylvania law, id. at 608-09, but felt its "concern [was] not with the wisdom of legislation but with
its constitutional limitation," id. at 608.
53 Id. at 613.
" Id. at 610.
I at 611. Relying upon West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
Id.
(1943), Justice Brennan stated that the constitutional test posed by the fourteenth amendment is much more rigorous when "transmitting the principles of the first amendment
" 366 U.S...at 611-12.
Id. at 613-16. Justice Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan stating, "this is not something
that can be swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness." Id. at 616.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
s Note, Wisconsin v. Yoder: The Right to Be Diflerent-FirstAmendment Exemption for
GI
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bert, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld administrative proceedings which denied appellant unemployment benefits for declining to work
on Saturday, the Sabbath of her faith.8 In reversing the decision of the
South Carolina court, the Supreme Court enunciated the standard to be
applied when religious conduct, not within the scope of permissible state
regulation, clearly conflicts with state action denying benefits on the basis
of that religious belief.' 0 The Court invoked the rigorous "compelling
state interest test," requiring the state to display a compelling interest to
justify the challenged legislation. s Moreover, the Court added that even
if the state displayed a significant interest in the questioned legislation, it
would be incumbent upon the state to demonstrate that no alternate
6
means, less restrictive of first amendment rights, could be utilized. 2
the Amish under the Free Exercise Clause, 22 DE PAuL L. REv. 539, 546 (1972). Considered
to be a major case, Sherbert established new standards for determining the validity of state
regulation which places incidental burdens on religion. See L. TRINE, supra note 40, at 84752. Appellant-Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was dismissed by
her employer because she refused to work on Saturday, the sabbath of her religion. 374 U.S.
at 399. Unable to locate alternative employment because of her religious observances, appellant filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. Id. at 399-400. This Act provided that a claimant was unworthy of benefits "'[i]f. . . he has failed, without good cause.. . to accept available suitable
work when offered him.... .'" Id. at 401. Appellee-Employment Security Commission denied Sherbert's claim for benefits, reasoning that her unavailability tor Saturday work subjected her to the above disqualification. Id. Ultimately, this position was affirmed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's argument that the disqualifying
provision abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion. Id.
59 Id.

" Id. at 403. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated that in order for the denial of
benefits to withstand scrutiny under the free exercise clause "it must be either because her
disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the state of her constitutional
rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's
religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation'.
Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). Utilizing the standard advocated
by the majority, the Court employed a two-part balancing test. Initially, appellant was required to show a substantial burden on the exercise of her religion resulting from the questioned law. 374 U.S. at 403-06. See also L. TRNE, supra note 40, at 852. Second, the imposition of such a burden would be valid only if the Court found that the State had established
a "compelling state interest" which outweighed the interference with free exercise rights.
374 U.S. at 406-09. Relevant to such an inquiry is the importance of the state's interest and,
as Professor Tribe has pointed out, the degree to which there are alternative means to
achieve it which do not burden religious activity. L. Tamz, supra note 40, at 852.
11 374 U.S. at 407. Although the state of South Carolina claimed that the disqualifying provision prevented fraudulent claims, the Court noted that no compelling or overriding state
interest had been demonstrated. Id. at 409. Moreover, even if this were conceded to be a
compelling state interest, there had been no showing by South Carolina that alternative
means of avoiding fraud were not available. Id. at 407. See also Freeman, Able to Work and
Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123, 131 (1945); Sanders, Disqualificationfor Unemploy-
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The Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder," another major free exercise pronouncement balanced the state of Wisconsin's interest in educating its
children against free exercise rights and the parental right to oversee the
rearing of their children, and ruled in favor of the latter." The Court
carved out an exception to the state's education program for the Amish
faith after lengthy examination of that sect by Chief Justice Burger, 5
who recognized the fatal effect of the state regulation on the Amish community.6 6 Significantly, the Supreme Court concluded that the state's
concededly strong interest in education was not sufficiently compelling to
67
override the Amish sect's interest in survival.
ment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REv. 307, 327-28 (1955). For treatment of the least restrictive
alternative test in a free exercise context, see L. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 852.
63 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
" Id. at 219, 234. In Yoder, members of the Amish faith were convicted of violating the
state's compulsory school-attendance law. Id. at 207. The statute required all parents to
maintain their children in school until reaching age 16. Id. Unwilling to comply with the
statute because of religious beliefs, the respondents declined to send their offspring to public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth grade. Id. Acknowledging that
they were subject to the terms of the statute, the respondents contended that enforcement
of the compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth grade would imperil, if not
extirpate, the free exercise of their religious beliefs. Id. at 216-19.
** Id. at 209-13. The Court was unanimous as to the result in this case, but three justices
filed separate opinions. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger employed the two-part
balancing test used in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra. Upon finding that there was a significant burden on the free exercise of
religion, the Court has to determine whether the parents' refusal to send children to the
school was based upon religious beliefs. 406 U.S. at 233-34. After careful consideration, the
Court found that the Amish lifestyle, educational practices, and refusal to submit their children to further secular education were religiously motivated. Id. at 219. More specifically,
the Court emphasized the following factors: (1) this was a shared belief by an organized
group rather than a personal preference; (2) the belief related to certain theological principles and interpretation of religious literature; (3) the system of beliefs pervaded and regulated their daily lives; (4) the system of belief and lifestyle had been in existence for a
significant period of time. Id. at 215-17.
" Id. at 218-19. The Court observed that the conclusion was "inescapable" that compulsory
education until age 16 would expose Amish children to influences and values clearly contrary to their religious beliefs, thus unduly interfering with the social and religious development of the Amish child into his faith community. Id. at 218. Concluding his discussion of
the Amish sect, Chief Justice Burger stated that:
In sum the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading . . . respondents' . ., mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education . . . would
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondent's religious beliefs.
Id. at 219.
11 Id. at 234-36. Since the Amish refusal to send children to school after eighth grade was
religiously based, the Court decided the permissibility of applying the compulsory education
laws to them pursuant to the two-part balancing test. Id. While not explicitly using the
"compelling interest" language in enunciating the standard to be used when reviewing
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The distinction between the constitutional protection afforded pure
religious belief and that afforded conduct motivated by religious belief
was given further credence by a plurality of the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Paty,ss wherein a Baptist minister was deemed ineligible to
serve as a delegate to the Tennessee Constitutional Convention by a Tennessee constitutional provision barring from the convention priests or
ministers of the Gospel. 69 Although the Court observed that the Tennessee law was not automatically invalid because it did not impinge upon the
freedom to believe,7 0 the law was nevertheless held unconstitutional because it "punish[ed] a religious profession with the privation of a civil
right. 17 1 Notably, the Court also indicated its intention to maintain the
status accorded religious exercise by reaffirming its pronouncement in
Yoder that "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of

religion. "72
claims under the free exercise clause, the Court apparently employed a more open balancing
inquiry. Id. at 214. The compulsory attendance statute could be applied to the respondent if
"the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or [if] there
is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
U 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
69 Id. at 621. McDaniel, a minister of the Baptist faith, filed as a candidate for delegate to
the constitutional convention. Id. A rival candidate, appellee-Paty, moved in Chancery
Court to disqualify McDaniel from the ballot because of a valid, but outdated, Tennessee
statute. Id. While the Chancery Court held in McDaniel's favor, based upon a violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, noting that
the disqualification of clergy placed no burden upon religious belief. Id. The Tennessee statute barred "minister[s] of the gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever" from serving as delegates to the state's constitutional convention. Id. at 621 n.1.
70 Id. at 626. Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion, in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist
and Stevens joined, concluding that the Tennessee statute violated the free exercise clause.
Id. at 629. The Court found that the law was not one that impinged upon the "freedom to
believe" and, therefore was not automatically invalid under Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961). 435 U.S. at 626. Furthermore, the Tennessee law regulated actions that related
to the individual's religion; thus it was to be reviewed in light of the balancing test of the
free exercise clause. Id. at 627-29.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, expressed dissatisfaction with the plurality's
reasoning, which drew a distinction between McDaniel's status and his beliefs. Id. at 635
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated:
According to the plurality, McDaniel could not be and was not in fact barred for his
belief in religion, but was barred because of. his commitment to persuade or lead
others to accept that belief. I simply cannot fathom why the Free Exercise Clause
"categorically prohibits" hinging qualification for office on the act of declaring a belief in religion, but not on the act of discussing that belief with others.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 626 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (G. Hunt ed. 1904)).
I7
78 435 U.S. at 628 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
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The cases surveyed above trace the development of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Significantly, the Court's more recent pronouncements appear to display
a heightened sensitivity to actions which have the effect of indirectly discouraging the full enjoyment of rights guaranteed by the free exercise
clause.7" Thus, should the Court determine that state action impermissibly infringes, directly or indirectly, upon the free exercise of religion,
Sherbert indicates that the compelling state interest inquiry will be applied in order to safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed right to religious freedom.
ZONING PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

In 1926, the Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 74
which has become the foundation of modern zoning law. The Euclid
Court observed that the need for comprehensive zoning plans and accompanying restrictions on the use of private property inherent in the plans
was a result of the modernization of the country, and that the restrictions, much like other regulatory measures, were wholly necessary to the
Recently, in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981),
the Supreme Court affirmed its earlier pronouncements which had extended the protections
of the free exercise clause to those instances in which state regulations impose an indirect
burden upon religious practice. Id. at 716-17; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963). The petitioner in Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, was initially hired to work in his
employer's roll foundry, which fabricated sheet steel for industrial uses. 450 U.S. at 710. The
foundry closed, however, and Thomas was transferred to a department that manufactured
turrets for military tanks. All other departments to which transfer was possible manufactured parts for weapons as well. The petitioner then requested to be laid off. When this
request was denied, he quit, asserting that his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production of weapons. He thereafter applied for unemployment benefits and
asserted that contribution to arms production violated his religion. Id. at 710-11. The hearing referee found that although the petitioner quit because of his religious belief, his termination was nevertheless voluntary and not based on "good cause" as required by Indiana
law. The case eventually reached the Indiana Supreme Court, where it was held that the
petitioner was not entitled to unemployment benefits, since his resignation was voluntary
and apparently for personal rather than religious reasons. Id. at 711-13. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that, as in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
the petitioner was "put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work
....
" 450 U.S. at 717. The Court stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
a religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
Id. at 717-18.
"' 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
73
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smooth function of society." In reversing the decree enjoining enforcement of the zoning ordinance, the Court implied that such economic and
secular regulations enjoy a presumption of constitutional validity.70 Thus,
" Id. at 386-87. Comprehensive zoning schemes have been the primary method of municipal
land-use control for over half a century. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 72. In
Euclid, the landmark zoning decision, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the
constitutionality of such comprehensive land-use regulatory ordinances. In Euclid, the village council adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance restricting and regulating the location of trades, industries, apartment houses, and other land uses. 272 U.S. at 379-80. The
plaintiff, as a landowner, challenged the ordinance because it placed the plaintiff's land in a
residential district where industrial and commercial uses were prohibited, thereby reducing
the value of the land. Id. at 384-85. Accordingly, the plaintiff attacked the ordinance on the
ground that it had been deprived of liberty and property without due process and equal
protection of law, in derogation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 384. The Village of
Euclid, however, maintaining the constitutionality of the ordinance, defended it on the theory that it was necessary to preserve the residential character and desirability of the neighborhood. Id. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Euclid Court, noted that comprehensive
zoning ordinances "must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted
for the public welfare." Id. at 387. Discussing the nature of the police power, however, the
Court indicated that "[tihe line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation." Id. Indeed, Justice Sutherland stated that a regulatory ordinance which would be valid as applied to cities might be
invalid as applied to rural communities. Id. In order to advance a more concrete standard to
evaluate the scope of a municipality's police power, therefore, the Court suggested that the
law of nuisances should be consulted on the issue. Thus, Justice Sutherland opined:
[T~he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a
particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a particular thing is
a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of
the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.
Id. at 388. The Court, however, refrained from treating the scope of the police power as
merely tantamount to that of the power to suppress or prevent nuisances, thereby tacitly
reaffirming the principle enunciated in Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 3il (1907), that the police
power is not confined "to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary. It
extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of its people." 272 U.S. at 391; see Bettman, The Decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Euclid Village Zoning Case, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 184, 188
(1927).
76 272 U.S. at 388-89, 395. A zoning ordinance is a legislative act, representing a judgment
concerning how certain land should be classified. See, e.g., id. at 388; Rodgers v. Village of
Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 121, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1951). Like all legislative acts, therefore,
a zoning law enacted by a municipality is presumed to be constitutional. Significantly, the
presumption of validity not only places the decision as to how a community shall be zoned
with the local municipality, but also places on the litigant attacking the ordinance the burden of pleading and proving its invalidity. E.g., Orth v. Board of County Comm'rs, 408 P.2d
974, 977 (Colo. 1965); Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 186, 306
N.E.2d 155, 158-59, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134-35 (1973); Taddeo v. Commonwealth, 49 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 485, 487-88, 412 A.2d 212, 213 (Commw. Ct. 1980). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 3.14-.17. Hence, the burden of negating all rational bases upon which
the zoning ordinance could be sustained rests with the litigant challenging the ordinance's

27 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1982
only when it appears that the ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable and
without any substantial relationship to the public health,7 welfare, safety,
or morals will a zoning law be deemed unconstitutional.1
The government's power to zone and "take" property pursuant to its
police power, even to the fringes of taking property for private use, was
affirmed in Berman v. Parker.78 Under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, the agency created by the Act had the power to use
private enterprise for redevelopment of certain areas in order to achieve
the legislative goals proposed. 79 The Supreme Court, in Berman, sanctioned the exercise of this power. Thus, a further broadening of the zonconstitutionality. See Comment, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Law of
Zoning: Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 673, 673-74.
7 272 U.S. at 395. Justice Sutherland recognized that although a zoning regulation might be
upheld in general scope when the remedy of injunction is sought, certain provisions could
nevertheless be found to be arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to particular premises,
particular conditions, or in connection with particular complaints. Id. In Euclid, however,
the relief sought was an injunction. Id. at 384. The Court therefore determined the ordinance's validity in toto, without assessing the effect of restraint imposed by one or more of
its innumerable provisions. Id. at 396-97.
70

348 U.S. 26 (1954).

7' District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to 5-719
(1973). The Redevelopment Act provided for the condemnation of private property for the
purpose of relieving the community of slums and blighted areas. Pursuant to the Act, the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency was to acquire title to all the property
within a designated area by purchase, gift, or eminent domain. Id. § 5-704(a). Once title to
the land was acquired, the agency was to devote a segment of the land to public use with the
remainder to be leased or sold to private enterprises who were to develop the area in accordance with the agency's comprehensive scheme. Id. § 5-706. The plaintiffs, owners of a department store in an area selected for redevelopment, claimed that since their property was
commercial and did not imperil health or safety, condemnation, for other than a public use,
would be unconstitutional. 348 U.S. at 31. Although agreeing with the plaintiff's contention,
the trial court refused to enjoin the construction, narrowly interpreting the Act to provide
merely for the reasonable necessities of clearing and preventing conditions injurious to public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705,
715 (1953), modified sub nom. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, but interpreted the statement much
more broadly. Justice Douglas, authoring the opinion of the Court, initially noted that public safety, public health, morality, and law and order, are solely illustrative of the application of police power to municipal affairs and do not delimit it. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32 (1954). Indeed, a unanimous Supreme Court stated that aesthetic considerations will
support the use of the power of eminent domain. Id. at 32-33. Accordingly, Justice Douglas
reasoned that since the concept of public welfare embodies the spiritual as well as physical,
and aesthetic as well as monetary, "[i]t is within the power of the legislatures to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 33. Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress validly exercised its power of eminent domain to enhance the public welfare, and the
fact that Congress chose to effectuate the public end through a private enterprise rather
than through a department of government did not preclude the exercise of authority. Id. at
33-34.
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ing power resulted, since established land uses were subject to appropriation by the government in order to implement the comprehensive zoning
programs held permissible in Euclid. More recently, in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,80 the Court considered the constitutional validity of a
zoning ordinance limiting the occupancy of one-family dwellings to either
"traditional" families or groups of not more than two unrelated persons.
Invoking the rational basis test to assess the validity of the ordinance,8 '
the Court ruled in favor of the municipality. 2 It is suggested that the
application of the rational basis test to a religious use challenge within a
zoning context raises the difficult question of whether this minimal level
of judicial review adequately protects the free exercise of religious beliefs. 8' In Belle Terre, the zoning power prevailed because it was held that
80 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Boraas, a group of unrelated college students who rented a home in

Belle Terre challenged the village zoning ordinance which provided exclusively for one-family dwellings. The ordinance, excluding from its provisions lodging houses, boarding homes,
fraternity complexes, or multiple-dwelling units, defined family in the conventional manner,
as including "[olne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants [,or, a] number of
persons not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption or marriage ....
" Village of Belle Terre, N.Y.,
Building Zone Ordinance art. I, § D-1.35a (June 8, 1970), quoted in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974). Alleging a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976), the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of the judgment
and a declaratory judgment invalidating as unconstitutional the ordinance's prohibition
against residential occupancy by more than two unrelated persons. 416 U.S. at 3. The district court upheld the ordinance on the ground that restricting land use to one-family residential areas was a legally protective, affirmative interest. Borass v. Village of Belle Terre,
367 F. Supp. 136, 144-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). On appeal, however, the Second Circuit, by a twoto-one vote, reversed, concluding that the ordinance was an improper exercise of the state
police power and an attempt to impose the prevailing social preferences upon an entire
community. 476 F.2d 806, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
decision of the Second Circuit, determining that the ordinance fell within the ambit of a
municipality's power to protect residential areas from calamitous intrusion. 416 U.S. at 9.
"' 416 U.S. at 8. Justice Douglas characterized the Belle Terre ordinance as solely economic
and social legislation. Id. In determining whether the ordinance violated the equal protection clause, therefore, the Court employed the "reasonable, not arbitrary test," concluding
that since the ordinance bore a rational relationship to a permissible state interest, it was
not violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
8 Id. at 7-10.
"' The first amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......
U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Although applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, this
religious liberty is qualified by the power of the states to legislate for the general health,
safety, morals, and welfare. Notwithstanding, since it is generally recognized that religious
institutions enhance the public welfare rather than hinder it, Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836-37, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862 (1956), the
imposition of regulations which infringe upon a religious use are often difficult to sustain.
Indeed, exclusion of churches from residential districts by zoning is of doubtful validity. See
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no fundamental constitutional right had been infringed?' In Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 6 an operator of an adult movie theater
challenged a zoning ordinance which required the geographic separation
of adult theaters. The ordinance attempted to prevent the concentration
of such theatres." Applying a substantial government interest inquiry,
Note, Regulation of the Location of Churches by Municipal Zoning Ordinances, 23 BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 186 (1957); Note, Zoning Laws and the Church, 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93,
98-100 (1952). Accordingly, since the free exercise of religion and the establishment of religious institutions are fundamental constitutional rights which enhance the public welfare, in
order to abridge these first amendment rights on the ground that they contravene the general health, safety, morals and welfare of the community, a compelling state interest appears
obligatory. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-24 (1972) (state needs a compelling
state interest in its system of compulsory education to infringe upon the established religious practices of the Amish faith); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (absent
compelling state interest, a state could not impinge upon the right to the free exercise of
religion under the first amendment).
" 416 U.S. at 7. Justice Douglas proclaimed that the Belle Terre ordinance "involve[d] no
'fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as. . .the right of association...
or any rights of privacy." Id. See generally Comment, Supreme Court Upholds Restrictive
Definition of Family in Zoning Ordinance,60 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 319-20 (1975). Notably,
in a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall, after undertaking an analysis of these issues, concluded that the zoning ordinance created a classification which inhibited both the freedom
of association and the right to privacy. 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly, in support of his contention that the ordinance was violative of the right to freely
associate, Justice Marshall quoted a concurring opinion that Justice Douglas authored a
year earlier, in which it was stated that the freedom of association encompasses the "'right
to invite the stranger into one's home' not only for 'entertainment' but to join the household
as well." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States Dep't of Agr. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 538-45 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
" The City of Detroit, in 1962, enacted an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" to combat urban
degeneration. See Detroit, Mich., Ordinance No. 742-G (1962). Amended in 1972, the ordinance restricted the use of enumerated enterprises, including adult movie theaters and adult
bookstores. Id. § 66.0000 (1972). Notably, to foster its claim that the ordinances were necessary to preserve the quality of the community, the city produced a sociologist who testified:
[T]he effect on neighborhoods of concentrations of businesses of the sort regulated
• . .is deleterious . . . .They attract the kind of people who frequent these places
and drive away those who do not. This contributes to the decline of a neighborhood.
A concentration of such businesses also causes the neighborhood to appear to be declining and this causes a lack of neighborhood pride, resulting in a further decline.
Norton v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd sub nom. American Mini
Theaters, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Contending that the ordinance violated their rights
guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments, the plaintiffs claimed that the ordinances were so vague as to deprive them of due process of law; that they were prior restraints and invaded protected communication; and that they were violative of the equal
protection clause because they classified the restricted theaters on the basis of content of
speech. 373 F. Supp. at 365. For a discussion of Young, see generally Friedman, Zoning
"Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Theaters, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 1293 (1977); Note, Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.: Creating Levels of Pro-
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the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant." The
Supreme Court, however, upheld the validity of the zoning law, rejecting
the respondent's constitutional challenges.ss
With respect to the respondent's contentions that the ordinance unconstitutionally classified motion pictures based upon their content, the
Court initially observed that "broad statements of principle, no matter
how correct in the context in which they are made, are sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute limit of the stated principle
is reached.""s The Court added that "[w]hen we review this Court's actual
adjudications in the First Amendment area, we find this to have been the
case with the stated principle that there may be no restriction whatever
on expressive activity because of its content."' 0 The Court then held that
tected Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.J. 321 (1977); Note, Zoning, Adult Movie Theaters and
First Amendment: An Approach to Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 379 (1979); Comment, Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
753 (1977).
87 373 F. Supp. at 369-71. The district court initially noted that because the ordinance dis-

tinguished adult bookstores and theaters on the basis of content of speech, the classification
restrained conduct protected by the first amendment. Id. at 369. Moreover, although recognizing that the validity of a classification which impinges upon the first amendment is subject to strict scrutiny, the court nevertheless concluded that the ordinance was constitutional, since the restrictions on the location of the adult establishments were based upon
substantial state interests and the burden on expression was merely indirectly related to the
ordinance. Id. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, the decision was reversed. American Mini Theaters, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1021
(6th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
Employing the "lesser means test," the Sixth Circuit held that the ordinance violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, notwithstanding a compelling state
interest to preserve the neighborhood, since less restrictive alternatives were available. 518
F.2d at 1019-20. Moreover, the court concluded that the ordinance was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on first amendment rights. Id. at 1018-21.
" 427 U.S. at 58-73. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded that the Detroit ordinance did not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, was not violative of the free exercise clause of the first amendment, and was not a
prior restraint on speech. Id.
" Id. at 65 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 65-66. The Court indicated that the content of speech often determines not only
whether speech is protected by the first amendment, but also what standard a court must
employ to determine if the speech is protected. Id. at 66 (citing, for example, Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (product advertising is permissible,
while political advertising is not); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964)
(actual malice required to sustain a libel action against a public official, while a lesser standard may be adequate for other individuals); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931) (publication of the movement of armies is prohibited, while publication of other
news stories is permissible)). Moreover, to further emphasize the justification for distinguishing protected from unprotected speech on the basis of the content of the speech, Justice Stevens analogized the instant situation to the suppression of sexually oriented materials, observing that a state can justifiably prohibit the distribution or exhibition of obscene
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the state could permissibly use the content of the motion pictures as the

basis for classifications.'
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"9 an East Cleveland zoning ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to single families, and recognized only a few restrictive categories of related persons as constituting a
"family." The Court initially distinguished the Belle Terre decision by
materials in addition to prohibiting the sale to minors of "sexually erotic" material not obscene by adult standards. 427 U.S. at 69 & n.33 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). Furthermore, despite the tenuous justification for distinguishing constitutionality of speech solely on the basis of content,
the Court concluded that content classification will not violate the government's "paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication." 427 U.S. at 70.
Justice Stevens reasoned, therefore, that adult bookstores and theaters-like obscene materials-can be restricted based upon content because of their dubious social value. Id. at 70.
Indeed, the Court proclaimed:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that
society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired
Voltaire's immortal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion
moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why
our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified
Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First
Amendment protects communication in this area from total supression, we hold that
the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing
them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
Id. at 70-71.
" Id.; see note 90 supra.
- 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
93 Id. at 495-96. The city of East Cleveland ordinance provided:
'Family' means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the
household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single
housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of
the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such unmarried children
have no children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of the household.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may include
not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the
household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and
dependent children of such dependent child. For the purposes of this subsection, a
dependent person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished for him by the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO, HOUSING CODE § 1341.08 (1966), quoted in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2 (1977).
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noting that the Belle Terre ordinance affected only unrelated individuals,
while the East Cleveland law "slic[ed] deeply into the family itself,"' 4 by
effectively making it a crime for a grandmother to live with two or more
grandchildren who were not siblings.'4 After recognizing the existence of a
liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court carefully examined the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they were served by the challenged regulation, determining that the law was at best marginally related to the
objectives cited by the city.'" The Court, therefore, struck down the
In Moore, the plaintiff lived with her son and two grandchildren, one of whom was a
child of her daughter. Because the grandchildren were cousins and not brothers, the "family" did not fit one of the permissible categories under the ordinance. She was notified that
one of her grandchildren was an illegal occupant. When the plaintiff failed to remove the
child or apply for a variance, she was convicted of a criminal offense, and her subsequent
appeals to the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court proved fruitless. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, however, a plurality of Justices reversed the
lower court opinions, concluding that the ordinance which limited households to a nuclear
family was violative of the fourteenth amendment. 431 U.S. at 505-06. For a discussion of
Moore, see generally Jensen, From Belle Terre to East Cleveland: Zoning, the Family, and
the Right of Privacy, 13 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1979); Note, Constitutionally Protected Notions of
Family: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 19 B.C.L. REv. 959 (1978); Comment, The Power
to Regulate People: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 55 DEN. L.J. 311 (1978); Comment,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 479 (1978).
4 431 U.S. at 498. In distinguishing Moore from Belle Terre, the Court emphasized that the
Belle Terre ordinance not only bore a rational relationship to a permissible state objective,
but "expressly allowed all who were related by 'blood, adoption, or marriage' to live together," thereby promoting "family needs" and "family values." Id. In contrast, the East
Cleveland ordinance regulated the very structure of family life, selecting on its face certain
categories of biologically related individuals who may live together and others who may not.
Accordingly, Justice Powell, who authored the opinion of the Court, concluded that "[w]hen
a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid
governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate." Id. at 499.
' Id.
at 497.
Ild. at 499-500. In discussing the due process claim, Justice Powell initially remarked that
the Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is a liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)). Moreover, the Court indicated
that it has been "consistently acknowledged [by the high court that there is] a 'private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'" 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting, for example,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1972)). Justice Powell determined, therefore,
that when the government intrudes upon family living arrangements, as did East Cleveland,
it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny and the Court will examine the "importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation." 431 U.S. at 499. Under this examination, the Court found that the goals of the
ordinance-avoiding overcrowding, minimizing traffic congestion and preventing an undue
financial burden on the school system-although legitimate, were served only marginally by
the provision. Id. at 500.
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ordinance.
Although the Supreme Court consistently has reaffirmed the constitutional validity of the power of states to zone, the Moore decision indicates that an exercise of the zoning authority is not impervious to constitutional challenge when a fundamental right is discerned. The Supreme
Court unequivocally has characterized the free exercise of religion as a
fundamental right and proscribed even indirect state-imposed burdens
upon that right. It is submitted, therefore, that the presumption of constitutionality accorded zoning ordinances and the application of the rational basis inquiry, which precludes reversal of a zoning board's decision
unless it is shown to be arbitrary and capricious, ineffectually safeguards
the elements of religious practice typically implicated in many zoning disputes involving religious sects. Indeed, it appears inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's assessment of the fundamental nature of free exercise
rights to require the existence of a mere rational basis to uphold a restrictive zoning ordinance against a bona fide free exercise challenge.
ZONING AND THE

FREE

EXERCISE CLAUSE

8 the SuIn Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont,"
preme Court of California held that it was an impermissible exercise of a
state's zoning authority to exclude private schools in an area in which
public schools were permitted." In Roman Catholic Welfare Corp., it was
established that "zone A" comprised 98.7% of the entire area of Piedmont and contained 98.2% of the entire population.1' ° The petitioner,
Welfare Corp., owned land in "zone A" and contemplated construction of

431 U.S. at 499. In concluding that the city did not set forth a sufficient governmental
interest to justify intrusion into family matters, the Court observed:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our
most cherished values, moral and cultural.
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.
Id. at 503-04 (footnotes omitted).
" 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955) (en banc).
Id. at 333-34, 289 P.2d at 443.
100 Id. at 327, 289 P.2d at 439. The ordinance in question divided the city into zones A, B,
C, and D. Private but not public schools were prohibited in zone A, which comprised 98.7%
of the geographical area of Piedmont and housed 98.2% of its residents. Id. Private schools
were permitted in the other three zones, but of the three, only two parcels of land were
unimproved. Id. Thus, the Court found that the ordinance "constitutes an effective exclusion of private schools ......
Id. at 333, 289 P.2d at 443.

RELIGIOUS USE FOR ZONING PURPOSES

a school adjacent to a church it operated.1 01 Petitioner's application for a
building permit was denied, however, solely on the ground that a Piedmont zoning
ordinance prohibited the construction of private schools in
"zone A." 10 '1The petitioner then initiated a mandamus proceeding to
compel the issuance of the required building permit.10"
Justice Carter, writing for the majority, initially noted that zoning
ordinances, when reasonable and not arbitrary, constitute a justifiable exercise of a state's police power. 10" Further, he observed that "every intendment is in favor of the validity of the exercise of police power" as
long as a reasonable basis exists supporting the establishment of a strictly
residential district, and the ordinance in question bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.105 The court
then turned to the question of whether there was a reasonable basis supporting the exclusion of private schools where public schools were permitted." The court rejected the contention that the purported discriminatory selection of students by private schools provided a sufficient
justification to exclude them from areas zoned for public schools.'0 Further, the court relied upon Pierce v. Society of Sisters'" in which the
Supreme Court held that an ordinance requiring school children to attend
public schools unreasonably interfered with the liberty of the parents to
direct the upbringing and education of their children.1 " Justice Carter
then observed that the zoning law in question compelled students to re101 Id. at 329, 289 P.2d at 439.
10,Id. at 326, 289 P.2d at 438-39.
I08
Id.
104 Id. (quoting Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 337, 175 P.2d 542, 547

(1946) (en banc)).
I" Id. (quoting Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 337, 175 P.2d 542, 547
(1946) (en banc)).
106Id.

" Id. at 330, 289 P.2d at 440. The court considered and rejected the reasoning of State ex
rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 97-98, 65 N.W.2d 43,
47 (1954), wherein the petitioner sought a building permit for a private school in a zone
which permitted only public schools. The Sinar court denied the permit, finding a rational
basis in the ordinance. Weighing heavily in the court's decision was the discriminatory nature of a private school. Reasoning that any eligible student may attend a public school,
while a private school may discriminate against eligible students, the court concluded that a
rational basis existed for permitting public schools while prohibiting private schools. 267
Wis. at 98, 65 N.W.2d at 47.
'"
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
'
Id. at 518-19. The Pierce Court recognized as "fundamental" the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children. Id. at 518. In Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City
of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955) (en banc), this right was extended to
embrace the ability to send "children to private schools, rather than public ones, which are
located in their immediate locality or general neighborhood." 45 Cal. 2d at 330, 289 P.2d at
441.
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ceive instruction only from public school teachers, violating the right of
parents, as discerned in Pierce, to direct the education of children under

their control. 110 . The court concluded, therefore, that the "compelling justification" required to sustain the discriminatory ordinance was absent,
warranting issuance of the building permit.'
In Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union,"'3 the plaintiff-township sought injunctive relief to restrain the defendant from using prop-

erty in violation of the applicable zoning ordinance." The controversy
centered upon the defendant's use of a tract of land as a campsite for
religious meetings."' During such meetings, the defendant used shacks
and tents for residential purposes which allegedly did not comply with
the construction requirements of the ordinance. " The ordinance, how110 See note 109 supra.

111 45 Cal. 2d at 334, 289 P.2d at 443. Although the court initially stated that the ordinance
in question need only conform to the rational basis test, id. at 326, 289 P.2d at 439, it was
suggested that the existence of a rational basis may be insufficient to justify certain discrim-"
inations, id. at 334, 289 P.2d at 443. It was also observed that the Supreme Court, in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 516 (1925), had determined that state authorities may not
compel students to attend only public schools. 45 Cal. 2d at 334, 289 P.2d at 443. But see
Tustin Heights Assoc. v. Board of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d 619, 339 P.2d 914 (Ct. App.
1959). In Tustin Heights, the district court of appeal considered the constitutionality of an
ordinance which restricted the location of all schools. 170 Cal. App. 2d at 624, 339 P.2d at
918. Under California law, however, the "State of California ha[d] occupied the field of public education" and therefore, public schools were not subject to the ordinance. Id. at 631,
339 P.2d at 922. The respondent-Church maintained that the effect of the ordinance was to
discriminate against private schools within the meaning of Roman Catholic Welfare Corp.
Id. The court distinguished Roman Catholic Welfare Corp., howeveri holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally discriminatory as long as it "purportled]" to restrict both
public and private schools. Id.
318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297 (1947).
Id. at 695, 29 N.W.2d at 298. The ordinance in question divided the township into five
districts ranging from residential to purely industrial, and set standards with respect to
lighting, sanitation, and building specifications. Id. at 696-97, 297 N.W.2d at 299. The defendant's land was located in a residential zone. Id.
114 Id.
at 698, 29 N.W.2d at 300. The defendant held religious meetings during the summers
of 1942 and 1943, each meeting lasting for periods of 2 weeks or longer. Id. Allegedly, the
residences on the premises did not comply with the standards established by the ordinance,
id. at 698-99, 29 N.W.2d at 300, and, in addition, the meetings were conducted "with such
degree of noise as to cause disturbance to others residing in the vicinity ....
such noise
continued from early in the morning until approximately 4:00 a.m. the following day," id. at
700, 29 N.W.2d at 300-01.
116 Id. at 700, 29 N.W.2d at 300. No building permit was obtained for the tents and shacks
although one was obtained for the caretaker's residence and the tabernacle. Id. at 698, 29
N.W.2d at 300. The ordinance set forth explicit standards as to required sanitation facilities
and construction specifications. Id. at 697, 29 N.W.2d at 299. The court did not discuss in
detail the degree of compliance present in the campsite, but concluded that the shacks and
tents "clearly did not comply." Id. at 699, 29 N.W.2d at 300.
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ever, expressly allowed for use of the premises as a "church.""' The defendant, therefore, contended that since its meetings were held for reli-

gious purposes, its use should be permitted under the "church" category,
thereby obviating the necessity of complying with the residential building

standards. The court disagreed, however, stating that "the conclusion
does not follow that every place in which religious services are held is a
church.""11 7 The court then found that the defendant's activities constituted a nuisance per se and affirmed the granting of injunctive relief. 11 8 If
it had been determined in Portage that the services in question were in-

deed a genuine and sincere function of its religious mission, the implicated free exercise considerations would mandate that the court determine whether the impositions of regulations, designed to mitigate the
offensive effects of the campsite, might operate to accommodate both the

interests of the community and the interests of the religious organization.
The solution reached by the Portage court served to eliminate the

church's activities completely.
In Association for EducationalDevelopment v. Hayward,'" the Supreme Court of Missouri, after construing a local ordinance,'1 0 affirmed
the revocation of an occupancy permit issued to a Catholic fraternity.'
The fraternity was composed of laymen who lived together in order to
facilitate pursuit of their religious beliefs.' 3 ' The zoning ordinance in
Id. at 697, 29 N.W.2d at 299. The ordinance permitted "private and two-family dwellings" and "churches," and further specified building requirements as to "dwellings." Id. The
defendant was found to be in violation of the building requirements. Id. at 699, 29 N.W.2d
at 300. Presumably, if the campsite qualified as a "church," these requirements would not
have been applicable.
.. Id. at 700, 29 N.W.2d at 300. The court examined the dictionary definitions of the term
"church" and found that the campsite did not qualify. It seems that the court was greatly
influenced by the degree of noise which continued until 4:00 a.m., and stated that "[it cannot be said that such use was within the contemplation of the ordinance." Hence, the campsite was found not to be a church and, therefore, was subject to the building requirements
applicable to "dwellings." Id., 29 N.W.2d at 300-01.
'
Id. at 705-06, 29 N.W.2d at 302-03.
533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
Id. at 582. The property in question was located in an "R-3" one-family residential district. Id. "R-3" was zoned for one-family dwellings with certain exceptions which included
convents, monasteries, rectories or parish houses. Id. Further, the ordinance defined a family as "one or more persons occupying a dwelling ... all of whom or all but two of whom are
"I

related ....

"

Id. The fraternity, in Hayward, included approximately eight unrelated

men. Id. at 581.
...Id. at 589. The permit originally had been issued by the Kirkwood building commissioner. On appeal, the city board of adjustment revoked the permit. Id. at 582. The circuit
court reversed the board, id., but the Missouri Supreme Court subsequently reinstated the
board's decision, id. at 589.
' Id. at 581. The aim of the fraternity in Hayward, was to facilitate "an intense spiritual
life in the world without (the members] abandoning their own social environment or the
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question, however, prohibited more than three unrelated persons from
living together, but permitted "monasteries," "rectories," and "convents. ' 128 In interpreting the ordinance, the court examined the definition
of "rectory, 11' 4 construing the term to permit only the residence of unrelated persons whose vocation was devoted to religious pursuit.'2 The
court thus concluded that since the fraternity was composed of laymen
not devoted to full-time pursuit of a religious life, the residence was not
permissible under the ordinance."" Significantly, the court examined the
question of whether the existence of a religious bond between the residents would render such a statute unconstitutional. The court concluded that the right to live as a religious fraternity was not "essential to
the free exercise of the constitutionally protected right. 12 7 It is suggested
that the narrow definition utilized by the court unnecessarily circumscribed the scope of protected religious activity, and displays an unfortunate reluctance on the part of many tribunals to recognize the existence
of the free exercise issue in the zoning context. In Hayward, the zoning
power doctrine was wielded to effectively deny a Catholic fraternity its
right to live and worship together.
In Sexton v. Bates,3 6 the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that a
Jewish mikvah12 was not a "church" or an "accessory use" and disallowed a building permit authorizing alterations for its construction in a
one-family house.180 Although the court recognized that the "modern
mikvah" was of deep religious significance, it held that it was not a
"church" within the meaning of the applicable zoning ordinance., The
exercise of their professional or secular occupation." Id.
u Id. at 582; see note 120 supra.
IU Id. at 584-86. The court found that the common thread running through all the definitions of "monasteries," "rectories," and "convents" was the full-time devotion of members
to religious life. Id.
I' Id. at 586. The court construed the ordinance to permit the residence of groups defined
as having members whose full-time occupation was religious life. Id.
I" Id.
"2 Id. at 587-88.
1" 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951), affd sub nom. Sexton v.
Essex County Ritualarium, 21 N.J. Super. 329, 91 A.2d 162 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
1" 17 N.J. Super. at 252, 85 A.2d at 836. In determining whether the mikvah was a church,
the court referred to a booklet on Jewish family life which both parties to the action had
relied upon. Id. at 252-53, 85 A.2d at 835-36. A mikvah, used mostly by Hebrew females, is a
ritualistic bathing place for purification in accordance with Jewish law. Id.
I- Id. at 259, 85 A.2d at 839. The Board of Adjustment of the City of Newark had approved
the issuance of a permit by the city authorizing the construction of a mikvah below the firstfloor level of a one-family dwelling. Id. at 248, 85 A.2d at 833. The premises were located in
a first-residence district as defined by section 3 of the zoning ordinance of the city of Newark, which permitted the existence of churches and accessory uses incident thereto. Id. at
248-49, 85 A.2d at 834.
131 Id. at 258, 85 A.2d at 839. The court stated that while the use of a mikvah could be
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court strictly construed the definition of the term "church" to be "a place
where persons regularly assemble for worship."18' The familiar resort to a
narrow semantic inquiry in Sexton, it is submitted, effectively precluded
consideration of the free exercise questions presented by the restriction.18 3 Indeed, the social functions of many religious organizations in-

clude church services, sports activities, various club functions, youth
groups and counseling encounters. It is therefore suggested that when a
certain segment of a congregation wishes to meet under a ritualistic
atmosphere, defined in a sect's doctrine as an important aspect of their
worship, the state may not intervene without employing the serious con-

sideration and careful balancing which evidences recognition of the potential infringement upon religious exercise rights.
In Archdiocese of Portlandv. County of Washington,1 34 the Archdiocese of Portland challenged the Washington County Board of Commissioners' denial of a conditional use permit for a church, school and gymnasium in a residentially zoned district.' 35 The court upheld the

administrative board's decision since, in its view, there existed a rational
termed a "church purpose," the applicable zoning ordinance only permitted "churches" and
not buildings to be used for "church purposes." Id. Further, the court refused to recognize
the mikvah as an accessory because the proposed mikvah was not to be located on the same
lot as any church building. Id.
"I The court adopted the definition of "church" recited in an earlier case involving the
construction of restrictive covenants. Id. at 255, 85 A.2d at 837; see Ritter v. Jersey City
Dist. Missionary Soc'y, 105 N.J. Eq. 122, 123, 147 A. 195, 196 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1929).
"1" 17 N.J. Super. at 256-61, 85 A.2d at 838. The defendants contended that the disallowance of the building permit for the construction of the mikvah would adversely affect their
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments guaranteeing freedom of assembly and
worship. Id. at 256-57, 85 A.2d at 838. The court, however, rejected the contention that the
case involved such constitutional issues. Id.; see Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind.
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 98, 117 N.E.2d 115, 123 (1954) (Emmert, J., dissenting); Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grosman, 30 N.J. 273, 277-78,
152 A.2d 569, 572 (1959); In re Trustees of the Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, 183 Pa.
Super. 219, 225, 130 A.2d 240, 243 (Super. Ct. 1957). Further, the court reasoned that there
were numerous areas where a mikvah could be constructed without violating the applicable
zoning ordinances. 17 N.J. Super. at 257, 85 A.2d at 838.
254 Or. 77, 458 P.2d 682 (1969) (en banc).
,s Id. at 78, 458 P.2d at 683. The Archdiocese of Portland applied for the conditional use
permit under the Washington County zoning ordinance which provides that churches,
schools, and nurseries, because of their "'public convenience of necessity or because of the
effect such uses might have upon surrounding properties,'" may be allowed in certain indicated zones. Id. at 79, 458 P.2d at 683. Upon the plaintiff's application, the planning commission recommended denial of the permit based upon findings of traffic problems and inadequate access to the site. Id. at 80-81, 458 P.2d at 684. On appeal, the board of
commissioners sustained the planning director's conclusion. Id. at 81, 458 P.2d at 684. The
plaintiff thereafter sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the decision to deny the
permit was arbitrary and capricious as well as discriminatory. Id.
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basis for the board's decision. ss Clearly, the Oregon court might have
resolved the issue by recognizing the existence of a free exercise question
and then imposing, if feasible, those regulatory measures which would operate to protect the surrounding populace from the hazard identified by
the proposed use. 181 The court's decision in Archdiocese of Portland,
however, completely foreclosed the religious entity's engaging in the disputed activity.
The Pennsylvania state courts apparently have focused upon whether
the nature of the proposed use was secular or religious in order to resolve
"religious use" conflicts. If the nature of the use is deemed secular, such
as a cemetery 88 or "radio" church operated for pecuniary gain,18 9 such
'" See id. at 87, 458 P.2d at 687. The court first noted that the considerations of the detrimental effects of zoning changes upon a comprehensive zoning plan did not obtain in the
instant case since the ordinance specifically provides that a conditional use "shall not be
construed to be a zone change." Id. at 83, 458 P.2d at 685. The court further observed that
the conditional uses permitted in the residential zones were "generally compatible" with the
character of the zone. Id. Thus, the board of county commissioners were limited in allowing
nonconforming uses to those categories of uses set forth in the ordinance. Id. at 85, 458 P.2d
at 686. The court reasoned, therefore, that absent danger to a zoning plan, its function was
only to review the "legislative action of a governmental unit engaged in carrying out a land
use policy" and not to determine whether the board made the correct decision based on the
facts presented. Id.; see Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App.
1065, 610 P.2d 273, 277 (Ct. App. 1980) (zoning ordinance permitting conditional use permit
for churches in a rural, single-family residential zone, but which did not necessarily include
authorization to operate a parochial school, is not in violation of the church's right to the
free exercise of religion); Christian Retreat Center v. Board of County Comm'rs, 28 Or. App.
673, 680, 560 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Ct. App. 1977) (zoning board's determination that proposed
use of land as a youth retreat center would have a "serious adverse effect" on the surrounding area upheld).
'" See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of N. Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 291, 342 N.E.2d 534, 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 756 (1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). In Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue, the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment to appeal the village board's denial of a variance concerning a setback
requirement. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's determination that the zoning
ordinance was unconstitutional, see 38 N.Y.2d at 291, 342 N.E.2d at 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
756, and defined the question as being whether the ordinances "contain guidelines which
promote such a permissible kind of compromise [between the rights of free exercise of religion and those of residents] or whether . . . they restrict religious uses without recognizing
their special, protected status under the First Amendment," id. at 288, 342 N.E.2d at 538,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
'" See In re Russian Orthodox Church, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959). The Russian
Orthodox Church intended to use as a cemetery 88 acres of land it had purchased. Id. at
128, 152 A.2d at 490. The township of Rochester provided in an ordinance that the district
in which the purchase land was located, known as Sunflower District, was zoned for residential and agricultural uses. Id. at 127, 152 A.2d at 490. More specifically, section 201(4) of the
zoning ordinance listed educational, religious, philanthropic and hospital uses as permissible. Id. at 128, 152 A.2d at 490. The appellant-church sought a permit to use its land as a
cemetery, labelling such use as "religious." Id. The court held that church ownership of land
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use is subject to normal regulation by the zoning authorities. Religious
1 41
use in the form of church houses1 40 and retreat homes has been upheld,
does not transform the intended secular use into a religious use, and reasoned that to hold
otherwise would mean that a slaughterhouse owned by a religious group requiring a certain
method of slaughtering would be permitted as a "religious use" in a predominantly residential zone. Id. at 129, 152 A.2d at 491. See also In re Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n, 379 Pa. 516,
520-22, 109 A.2d 537, 539-40 (1954).
'" See Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 669 (Dist. & County Ct.
1963). In Gallagher,a permit was granted by the zoning authorities to the Young People's
Church of The Air, Inc. to operate a radio broadcasting studio in a residential district on the
basis of a provision in the Philadelphia Code allowing "churches, chapels, convents, monasteries, and their adjunct residential dwellings" in such zones. Id. at 669-70. In reviewing the
record, the court noted that the proposed radio station was to be supported through donations and the sale of commercial time and that "no conventional church building of the type
in which people gather to worship" would be built. Id. at 671. The court, citing In re Russian Orthodox Church, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959), stated that the relevant standard
was the "proposed use of the land and not the nature of the using organization." The court
concluded, therefore, that since a radio station is not a church, it failed to conform to a
permitted use within the definition supplied by the code. 32 Pa. D.& C.2d at 673-74.
340 See Conversion Center, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. 306, 307-08, 278
A.2d 369, 369 (Commw. Ct. 1971). The Conversion Center, a nonprofit corporation, purchased a house in Philadelphia to use for religious worship, office work, church-school classes and accommodation of missionaries while in Philadelphia. Id. Although the property was
located in an "R-2" zone permitting religious uses, the city zoning authorities notified the
Conversion Center that its use was unlawful since no registration permit was obtained. Id.
at 308, 278 A.2d at 370. The ensuing permit request was denied on the grounds that the side
yard was only 2 feet wide rather than the required 10 feet. Id. On appeal, since no "unnecessary hardship" had been shown and the property in fact was being used as a church and
convent, the zoning authorities refused to grant a variance. Id. Pursuant to remand by the
court of common pleas, the board held hearings to examine the use of the property. Id.
Although the Conversion Center's use was substantially the same as before, the board now
refused the variance request concluding that the premises were, in fact, not being used as a
church. Id. The board's decision was affirmed by the court of common pleas. Id. The commonwealth court reversed, holding that the appellant's use of its property "comports with
any conceivable definition of a church or other place of worship".and, therefore, under section 14-1702(5) of the Philadelphia Code of Ordinances, it was not required to obtain a
registration permit or a variance. 2 Pa. Commw. at 309, 278 A.2d at 370 & n.1.
"' See, e.g., In re Stark, 72 Pa. D. & C. 168 (Dist. & County Ct. 1950). In Stark, the board
of adjustment for Pittsburgh granted an occupancy permit to the Franciscan Fathers of the
Capuchin Order, permitting the use of its property as a spiritual retreat, notwithstanding
that the property was located in an area zoned for "best residences." Id. at 169-70. The
petitioners, owners and residents of the property surrounding the Order's property, sought
reversal of the zoning board's judgment. Id. at 169. The court in Stark, stating that the
board of adjustment did not abuse its discretionary power in granting the permit, reasoned
that the term "church" should be interpreted broadly so as to include "any purpose connected with the religious practices which the group or sect maintaining that particular
church desires to pursue." Id. at 189, 192; see In re Trustees of Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses, 183 Pa. Super. 219, 224, 130 A.2d 240, 243 (Super. Ct.) (denial of variance request by church upheld where regulation bears reasonable relation to public safety), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 355 U.S. 40 (1951).
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however, because such use is sufficiently incident to the religious ceremonies to justify inclusion in authorized church or religious use zoning
tracts. It is suggested that the inquiry employed by various courts, which
seeks to determine if a use is "customarily incident" to a church and thus
permissible, often too narrowly circumscribes the elements of religious
practice.
It is axiomatic that the state has important interests in maintaining
various regulations which operate to preserve the public welfare. It is submitted, however, that zoning ordinances which substantially interfere
with the free exercise of religion by restricting religious uses should be
subject to the strict scrutiny of the compelling state interest inquiry. Further, in order to comport with structures imposed by the demands of the
free exercise clause, it is suggested that courts should avoid an overly narrow interpretation of the terms "church" or "religious use" for the purposes of zoning classification determinations. Although religious beliefs
and conduct may not be realistically separated in the context of a free
exercise claim, regulation of religion, which permits reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions in order to protect the public from potentially dangerous practices, is consonant with free exercise considerations.
Difficulties may arise, however, when the less traditional functions of religious sects remain subject to those restrictive zoning regulations reserved
for uses not subsumed within a narrowly construed "religious use" classification. An evident trend is the requirement of increased deference to
the guarantees of the free exercise clause when state regulations infringe
directly or indirectly' upon religious practice. It is submitted, therefore,
that an overly literal application of the accessory use or "incident to"
inquiry, operating to prevent religious organizations from engaging in a
broad range of appurtenant activities, is not likely to comport with the
Supreme Court's heightened sensitivity to the demands of the free exercise clause.
Coe v. City of Dallas148 illustrates the results of a narrow approach
to the question of whether a religious activity falls within a particular
definition for the purposes of a zoning determination. In Coe, the appellants brought a mandamus proceeding against the city of Dallas in order
to compel the city to issue a building permit for the purpose of facilitating the construction of a church.'" One of the issues presented was
See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
143 266 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
,44Id. at 182. The proposed building site was located in an area covered by a temporary
zoning ordinance which provided that no buildings other than single-family dwellings could
be constructed without the express authorization of the Dallas city council. Id. Initially, the
court addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying the writ of mandamus.
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whether the city of Dallas improperly had denied the appellant permission to erect the structure.4" Pursuant to temporary zoning ordinances,
permission of the city council was required for construction of any building other than a single family house."' In upholding the council's denial
of permission, the trial court found that 2,400 feet of the premises were to
be used as healing or prayer rooms, while 600 square feet were to be used
for the church proper. 4 Notably, on appeal, the civil court implied that a
determination as to whether appellant's proposed site would constitute a
church, would have presented a different question with respect to the city
council's denial of the permit. " s The civil court, however, did not question the propriety of the council's characterization of the site, observing
that there was ample evidence to support the council's determination that

the proposed use "would be a nuisance and contrary to the comfort and
welfare of the neighbors.""" The court then denied the writ of mandamus
sought by the appellant-religious organization.'"0
In Coe, the city council's threshold determination that the proposed
site was not a church appears dubious. The trial court conceded that
prayer rooms had existed, regular services were to be held, and ritualistic
healing was to be practiced. The court further recognized that there was a
sizeable congregation which attended the services.' 5 ' The council's deterId. Since "reasonable doubt" existed and the exercise of discretion by the city council was
required, the appellate panel concluded that the trial court had been correct. Id.
146Id. In addition to the issue of whether the denial of the writ of mandamus was correct,
the court, on appeal, addressed whether the city council had the power to find that the
proposed building was not a church, and whether the city council could find that the proposed use constituted a probable nuisance. Id.
146

Id.

"I Id. at 183.
14 See id.
141 Id.
The court of civil appeals reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to support the
findings of the council and trial court that the premises would not be used as a church. Id.
In addition to noting the small amount of square feet allocated to the actual church, the
court observed that while general membership swelled to approximately 700 to 1100 people,
only 30 to 100 people were present at services. Id. Moreover, it appeared that the primary
activity conducted by the reverend was healing, accompanied by tent services with loudspeakers, radio broadcasts, and ambulances. Id. The court held that the city council had the
power to decide that the proposed use of the site would constitute a nuisance. Id. Further,
the court determined that "[tJhis seems not to be a congregation seeking a place to worship,
but an individual and a corporation seeking a location to practice their particular method of
healing." Id.
15 Id.
at 184. See also Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
(operation of day school classes for preschool children did not constitute "worship and religious training" and was therefore not allowed in single family zone).
1 266 S.W.2d at 183. The appellant, Reverend Coe, testified that between 30 and 100 people attended services. This group, however, constituted only about 10% of the total
membership.
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mination, with respect to the issue whether the site was a church, appar-

ently turned upon the fact that activities, traditionally not perceived as
incident to a church, were to be conducted on the site. The council, however, ostensibly ignored the fact that a church indeed was present. The
court's failure to acknowledge the existence of appellant's church and the
subsequent denial of the building permit, therefore, effectively precluded
operation of both the church and the allegedly objectionable activities.
Notably, no effort was made to mitigate the detrimental aspects of the
proposed use.
TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

5 a religious corpoIn Synod of Chesapeake, Inc: v. City of Newark,"'
ration brought suit against the city of Newark to contest the city's order
to discontinue use and occupancy of its premises as a coffeehouse for University of Delaware students."5 ' In 1963, plaintiff, Synod, obtained a
building permit from the defendant, city of Newark, which authorized the
plaintiff to install a private lunchroom in the cellar of the premises. 1 " It
was alleged that since 1964 the cellar had been used on a weekly basis by
the plaintiff as a coffeehouse, serving light snacks and soft drinks.'55 The
applicable zoning ordinance did permit churches and residences.'" In
1965, the defendant, by written notice, ordered the plaintiff to discontinue use and occupancy of the premises. 57 A restraining order was obtained by the plaintiff pursuant to which the defendant was required to
show cause as to why an injunction should not issue in conformity with
the terms of the outstanding restraining order.'" The defendant contended that the plaintiff was not a church in the conventional sense but,
rather, a coffeehouse and public meeting place. 5 9 The plaintiff asserted,
however, that the activities carried on at the premises were entirely ap-

152254 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1969).
11- Id. at 612. The plaintiff, a religious corporation serving as the corporate body of the
United Presbyterian Church, held title to premises known as the Phoenix Center. The
building had been used until 1963 as a house of worship, an office for a Presbyterian pastor,
and a public meeting hall for students at the University of Delaware. Id.
'
Id.
1"1Id. The lunchroom purportedly was installed in furtherance of the plaintiffs ministry at
the University of Delaware. Id.
'" Id. Section 401 of the zoning ordinance of the city of Newark provided that a church
could be properly situated at the location of the plaintiff's premises since it was contained in
a residential "RS" district. Id.
,57 Id. The defendant, city of Newark, contended that the premises were being occupied in
violation of the city ordinance. In addition, the building's wiring and sanitary arrangements
allegedly violated other city building regulations. Id.
I" Id.
169 Id.
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propriate and desirable in a church group which attempts to foster religion on a college campus.160 It had been established, moreover, that a duly
ordained minister acted as pastor to the students, that Bible and prayer
meetings were conducted, and that regular services were held.'6 1 It was
further established, however, that speakers at the center had spoken on
nonreligious subjects as well as religious, and that "underground" films,
some stressing antiwar and sexual themes, had been shown.'"
The court, in Synod, unequivocally rejected the defendant's request
that church-related accessory activities be narrowly construed to permit
only those functions directly related to the religious mission of a religious
organization. 1 s The court stated that "any contemporary church group,
to be worth its salt, must necessarily perform non-religious functions
... . ,"164 Finally, in granting the plaintiff's request for an injunction, the
court broadly construed the definition of a church, stating:
I am satisfied that plaintiff has demonstrated that it is reasonably probable
that on final hearing other activities carried on on the premises will be
shown to relate in one way or another to plaintiff's attempt to make Christianity meaningful to questioning young people who will not accept the rigid
structure and conventions of traditional Christianity.'"
Id.
Ie
IId. at 613. The sole building devoted to Presbyterian services for students at the University of Delaware was that of the plaintiff. Id. at 612-13.
"e Id. The building was also used as a distribution point for a controversial publication. Id.
at 613.
"I Id. at 613-14. The court noted that the coffeehouse approach had been used extensively
by the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Lutheran Churches in an attempt to reach various
groups with the social teachings of Jesus Christ. Id. at 613. Although unconventional in
nature, the court found the plaintiff's activities to be related to church ritual. Id. at 614
(citing In re Faith for Today, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 634, 194 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1959), rev'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 718, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d
761, 174 N.E.2d 743, 215 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); Corporation of Presiding Bishops of the Jesus
Christ Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 488 P.2d 185 (1968)). The
definition of the term "church," as applied to zoning ordinances, has been broadly construed
by the courts of several jurisdictions. Damascus Community Church v. Calckamas County
Bd. of Comm'rs, 32 Or. App. 3, 7 n.1, 573 P.2d 726, 728 n.1 (Ct. App. 1978); see, e.g., TwinCity Bible Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 50 Ill.
App. 3d 924, 927, 365 N.E.2d 1381, 1384
(App. Ct. 1977); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 46-47, 76 N.E.2d
597, 601 (Ct. App. 1948); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 525-26, 136
N.E.2d 827, 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 862 (1956); Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,
66 Misc. 2d 312, 317-19, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971); State ex rel.
Covenant Harbor Bible Camp v. Steinke, 7 Wis. 2d 275, 282, 96 N.W.2d 356, 361 (1959);
notes 1 & 11 supra.
' 254 A.2d at 613-14. The court distinguished this case from others where the alleged
church-related activities rose to the level of a nuisance. Id. at 613; see Portage Township v.
Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich. 693, 705-06, 29 N.W.2d 297, 302-03 (1947); Coe v. City of
Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
1 254 A.2d at 614.
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In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ashton,'" the plaintiff sought to restrain
the city of Idaho Falls from issuing a building permit to a church and to
restrain the church from maintaining a lighted recreational complex in a
residentially zoned neighborhood.1 6 7 In 1958, respondent, Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop, purchased approximately 71/2 acres of land in an
area later classified as residential by a city zoning ordinance." 8 A portion
of the land purchased by the respondent was to be used as a recreational
complex and softball field. 169 The field was to be illuminated by high intensity lights. Prior to construction, the church had consulted with a city
building inspector who reviewed the plans, including the proposed complex. The inspector assured the respondent that no zoning laws were violated and that no building permit was necessary for the excavation
work.' Further, it was stated that when the plans for the church building were ready, a permit would be issued for the entire complex.17' The
church then constructed the recreational complex.1 7 1 When the plans for
the church and parking lot were complete and later submitted, however,
the city refused to grant the permit because the instant action had been
instituted by various neighbors whose homes surrounded the church
property. 73 Prior to the city's refusal to issue the permit and the institution of the action, the church had conducted a 2-week softball tournament on the complex.' 7 ' Games often began as early as 6 p.m. and ended
as late as 11:30 p.m. Several neighbors in the area objected to the bright
lights, while others complained about the noise, dust, traffic, and trespassing baseballs.17 ' The city, in response to the complaints, discontinued
electrical service to the respondent's complex. Shortly thereafter, the respondent instituted an action seeking to compel the city to restore its
electrical service. 76 The city and the respondent settled their dispute,

'
16I
1

92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185 (1968).
Id. at 573, 448 P.2d at 186-87.
Id. at 572, 448 P.2d at 186.

369 Id.
170

Id.

171

Id.

17S

Id.

Id. At the time of the original acquisition of the property by the church, only a few
homes existed in the area. Id. Subsequently, people built homes and acquired residences in
the zoning district. The court found that none of these early purchasers knew that the proposed recreational facility would be lighted. Id. In addition, later purchasers testified that
although they were aware of the existence of the facility, they believed that the proposed
plan for a lighted recreational complex had been abandoned. Id.
174 Id.
"7 Id.
The Idaho Falls City Council conducted several meetings in an attempt to solve the
178

problem. Id. at 572-73, 448 P.2d at 186-87.
176 Id. at 573, 448 P.2d at 187.
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reaching an agreement whereby the church's electrical power was restored, subject to a 10 o'clock curfew.177 Various homeowners who had
intervened in the action, however, filed a third-party complaint, seeking
both an injunction to restrain the city from issuing the building permit to
the respondents, and a determination that the recreational' complex was
in violation of the applicable zoning laws. 7 8 It was alleged in the complaint that the lighted recreational center was not a proper incidental
church use, and that, in any event, the complex was a nuisance and
should be abated.17 9 The trial court held for the city and the third-party
plaintiffs appealed.180 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed,
holding that a reasonable recreational facility is a permissible accessory
use included within the term "church. '"'
The court observed that there exists an "almost universal rule that
churches and their attendant uses are permitted in residential areas and
that a loss of tax revenue, a decrease in property values, increased noise,
or traffic are not sufficient grounds to justify excluding a church from a
residential neighborhood." 18' Furthermore, the court expressed its approval of the compromise fashioned by the trial court which limited use
of the complex to the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m."s3 The court stated:
1

Id.

M78
Both the church and the city were named as third-party defendants in the action. Id.
17

Id.

"0 The district court held that the maintenance of such a recreational facility between the
hours of 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. mountain standard time was not prohibited in an R-1 zone
and did not constitute a nuisance. Id. The court, denying appellant's request for an injunction, ordered the city to issue the church a certificate of occupancy and any necessary building permits. Id.
The court observed that according to the applicable zoning ordinance, family dwellings,
churches, schools, libraries and farming and truck gardening were permissible uses of the
land. Id. at 574, 448 P.2d at 188. Since the word "church" was not defined by the ordinance,
the court looked to other sources for its definition, and concluded that a church "is something more than merely a building in which the actual religious services are held." Id. (citing
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1956)).
l8392 Idaho at 574, 448 P.2d at 188; see Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508,
524-26, 136 N.E.2d 827, 835-36, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 861-82 (1956). Various authorities have
held that traffic, noises, and other inconveniences are insufficient grounds upon which to
deny a building permit to a church. E.g., 8 E. McQuLLIN, THE LAW oF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.131f (3d ed. 1976); 6 F. YoKLuY, supra note 4, § 35-14; see, e.g., Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 347-48, 172 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1961); In re Garden City Jewish
Center, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 1014, 155 N.Y.S.2d 523, 528 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956); State
ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229,
247-48, 39 N.E.2d 515, 523-24 (1942); Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Or. 600,
607-08, 15 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1932).
'" 92 Idaho at 574, 448 P.2d at 187. The court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,
however, modified the decree by changing the reference "Mountain Standard Time" to
"prevailing Mountain Time" to account for daylight savings time. Id. at 579, 448 P.2d at
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The question is largely one of degree. In the present case the unrestricted[,]
excessive or uncontrolled use of a recreational complex as large as the one
involved here could not be justified as an accessory use to the church building itself. But with the restrictions imposed by the district court, the use of
this complex is reasonable.'84
The court then rejected the contention that the use of the high intensity
lights violated the zoning ordinance and concluded that a recreational
field, lighted or unlighted, was a permissible use. 8 5 The Ashton case illustrates, therefore, that the interests of all parties involved can be accommodated through the imposition of minimal regulations designed to mitigate the objectionable effects of a particular use.'"6
It is suggested that the increased deference to the free exercise clause
advocated by this Article will not foreclose municipal authorities from
imposing those regulations necessary to maintain the health and safety of
its citizens. Although not a case in which the zoning authority was the
restrictive state power, Kansas ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministries,
Inc.,1 7 provides support for the proposition that municipal authorities
may protect the general welfare despite the enhanced immunity from
state regulation enjoyed by religious organizations under the standard
proposed herein. In Heart Ministries, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of a permanent injunction issued against Heart Ministries, Inc., prohibiting the operation of a private children's home without a state license. 18' The appellant, Heart Ministries, Inc., which
193.
'" Id. at 575, 448 P.2d at 189.
185 Id. Several former city officials testified that the lighting of tracts of land had never been
raised as a ground for denying a permit under the applicable zoning ordinance. Id. In addition, the court noted that the ordinance consistently had been interpreted so as to allow
lighted recreational fields. 92 Idaho at 575-76, 448 P.2d at 189-90. The court also rejected
the contention that night baseball on a lighted field constituted a public or private nuisance.
Id. at 576, 448 P.2d at 190.
'" The Ashton court asserted that a tribunal should not enjoin the playing of baseball as a
nuisance when the particular objectionable features of the circumstances could be eliminated. Id. at 577-78, 448 P.2d at 191-92. The court found that several of the problems that
the appellants objected to already had been remedied, namely, the parking lot had been
paved to eliminate the dust problems, and a fence had been installed to prevent trespassing.
To solve the problems of glare and noise emanating from the softball games, the court was
satisfied that the imposition of a curfew was an appropriate remedy. Id. at 575, 448 P.2d at
189.
187 Kansas ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministeries, 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1981).
'" Id. at 258, 607 P.2d at 1112. In Heart Ministeries, the defendants were operating, without a license, a maternity hospital, and a home and placement agency for juveniles under
the age of 16. In 1972, the founders of Heart Ministeries, Reverend and Mrs. Cowell, had
purchased 117 acres of land on which they built a parsonage, a large multipurpose metal
building which housed a chapel, church offices, radio studio and school. Id. at 246, 607 P.2d
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operated a home for juveniles, attacked the licensing requirement on the
ground that its rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment had been violated.""9 The trial court granted the state's request for
a permanent injunction, holding that the countervailing compelling interest of the state in protecting its children outweighed the appellant's free
exercise claim.1s0 On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, recognizing the state's compelling interest in regulating for the protection of
children.191
Distinguishing appellant's situation from those instances in which restraints upon the dissemination of religious ideas have been held unconstitutional, the court noted that "[t]he teaching of religious doctrine to
children cannot be equated with every aspect of physical care of children
. ..

".192

The court further observed that the United States Supreme

Court had rejected "challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religous beliefs or
at 1104. Finally, in 1977, construction of a large girl's dormitory was completed. Until that
time, the Cowells operated the "Victory Village Home for Girls," and housing was provided
in nearby homes, trailers, or with the Cowells themselves. In addition, a nonaccredited
school was maintained which 13 girls were attending at the time of the trial. Id. at 247, 607
P.2d at 1105. The state thereafter sought an injunction prohibiting the Cowells from continuing their activities in "Victory Village" without first obtaining a license. Id. at 245, 607
P.2d at 1104.
,o Id. at 253-54, 607 P.2d at 1109. At trial, Reverend Cowell testified that, although he had
no religious objection to health and safety regulations, he nevertheless challenged specific
regulations on the ground that they conflicted with the scriptures. Notably, the defendant
objected to the prohibition of corporal punishment, the requirement of financial disclosure,
the requirement of disclosing records of children to the state, and the need to provide for
medical consultants in advance. Id. at 250, 607 P.2d at 1107.
I Id. at 251-53, 607 P.2d at 1108-09. Granting the injunctive relief, the trial court held that
Kansas had a compelling state interest in regulating the operation of a home for juveniles.
Id. The court observed that the defendants had been involved in, inter alia, housing children and pregnant girls, arranging for the adoption of illegitimate children, punishing children with beatings, and restricting mail, dress, communication, education and freedom of
religion of the housed juveniles. Id. at 250, 607 P.2d at 1107.
19, Id. at 257, 607 P.2d at 1112. Recognizing that the licensing statute was aimed at children
whose parents are absent, the court held that, under the parens patriae doctrine, the state
had the power to legislate for the welfare of children within its jurisdiction. Id. at 252-53,
607 P.2d at 1109.
'9' Id. at 256, 607 P.2d at 1111. The court rejected the defendant's allegation that the licensing fee required by the Kansas statute constituted a "per se violation of the free exercise clause." Id. at 255, 607 P.2d at 1110. Distinguishing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 113-14 (1943), which struck down the requirement that Jehovah's Witnesses obtain a
city license to conduct door-to-door solicitation, the court emphasized that, in the instant
case, "activities secular in nature" were involved. 227 Kan. at 256, 607 P.2d at 1111. The
court stated that, "while religious beliefs cannot be regulated, some overt acts, though in the
exercise of one's religious convictions, are not totally free from legislative restriction." Id.
Moreover, the court regarded the fee as minimal ($5 per year). Id. at 257, 607 P.2d at 1112.
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3

The court then concluded:

The compelling interest of the State, as parens patriae, is the protection of its children from hunger, cold, cruelty, neglect, degradation, and inhumanity in all its forms. To fulfill this responsibility, the legislature has
elected to impose licensing and inspection requirements. To these requirements the defendants' free exercise rights must bow; the balance weighs
heavily in favor of those unfortunate children whom the State must
protect.'"
THE NEW YORK APPROACH

In Community Synagogue v. Bates,1'5 the Court of Appeals of New
York reversed the determination of a zoning board of appeals which de-

nied a use permit under a village zoning ordinance."" The court, although
Id. at 256, 607 P.2d at 1111 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).

227 Kan. at 257, 607 P.2d at 1112.
'"

1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956).

'" Id. at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26. The petitioner applied to the board of
appeals of the village of Sands Point for a permit to use a 24-acre tract of land, including an

expansive mansion, as a church for worship services, religious teaching, and for youth and
community activities. Id. at 448, 136 N.E.2d at 489-90, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18. The property
was located in a "Residence A District." The relevant zoning ordinance provided in pertinent part:
No building may be erected, altered or used, and no lot or premises may be used
except for the following purposes:
3. Churches for public worship and other strictly religious uses and in accordance
with the discipline, rules and usages of the religious corporation which will own, support and maintain such church and the ecclesiastical governing body, if any, to which
such corporation is subject ... providing any such use and accessory use has been
approved by the Board of Appeals after taking into consideration the public health,
safety and general welfare ....
7. Accessory uses shall be of the same character and nature as the use to which the
same is accessory. The Board of Appeals may, in appropriate cases, require as a condition of any permit issued under this section, for the purpose of establishing reasonable safeguards for the safety, health and welfare of the occupants and users of buildings and their accessory structures, that the applicant and the buildings and their
accessory structures on the premises shall comply with the provisions of the ...
'General Building Construction Code' . . . and may require that the premises, the
subject of the application, shall not be used for the purposes permitted by the Board
of Appeals except upon the issuance by the Building Inspector of a certificate of
occupancy certifying that the terms and conditions of the permit have been complied
with.
Id. at 450-51, 136 N.E.2d at 491, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20 (emphasis in original). At the hearing, the only objection raised was by the village board of trustees, whose only witness, the
village building inspector, testified that he needed complete specifications to determine
whether the building conformed to the state building code. Id. at 449-50, 136 N.E.2d at 49091, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 19. The petitioners presented six witnesses on their behalf and offered
into evidence the alterations necessary to comply with the fire laws as well as a contract
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declining to strike down the ordinance, found erroneous the board's conclusion that the property was to be utilized for other than a church or
other strictly religious use.'" Additionally, the court regarded as unsupported the board's determination that public health, safety, convenience
and welfare would not be served 'by the granting of the permit.'"8 The
court, thus, concluded that to accord the board of appeals the authority
to deny an application for a church at any one particular site would be to
confer upon it the power to dictate the location of a place of worship, and
thereby interfere with the "free and unhandicapped exercise of
religion. '"199
already entered upon to make those alterations. Id. at 450, 136 N.E.2d at 491, 154 N.Y.S.2d
at 19. In denying the application, the board of appeals held, inter alia, that the proposed
use of the premises was for other than religious purposes, and imposed conditions necessary
to obtain the desired permit. Id. at 452, 136 N.E.2d at 492, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
'97 1 N.Y.2d at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22. The court stated that "[a]
church is more than merely an edifice affording people the opportunity to worship God.
Strictly religious uses and activities are more than prayer ... all churches recognize that
the area of their responsibility is broader than leading the congregation in prayer." Id., 136
N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21. Moreover, the court indicated that the ordinance permitted not only use for purposes of worship, but also use for religion-oriented social activities.
Id., 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 22; see In re Garden City Jewish Center, 157
N.Y.S.2d 435, 438 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956). In Garden City, the petitioner sought
relief from a permit provision barring use of the premises for other than "public worship
and other religious uses." Id. at 437. The court held that relief would be inappropriate, since
the "religious uses" would encompass "corporate meetings, meetings of the congregation's
sisterhood and men's club or meetings of the Boy. Scouts and Girl Scouts." Id. at 438.
'" 1 N.Y.2d at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The Bates court stated that it
found no evidence of factual findings to support the board's conclusions, and that such findings, which are the province of the board, were necessary to determine whether the board's
conclusions were "arbitrary, capricious or unauthorized." Id. at 454-55, 136 N.E.2d at 493,
154 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23; see People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh, 244
N.Y. 280, 287, 290-91, 155 N.E. 575, 577, 578 (1927). Additionally, the Bates court held that
the imposition of conditions on the issuance of the permit was in violation of the ordinance.
1 N.Y.2d at 452, 136 N.E.2d at 492, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The court stated that the petitioner
need only show site, location and existing use of the premises to be granted a change of use
permit. Id. at 456, 136 N.E.2d at 495, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The court held that the board of
appeals had exceeded its power, granted by the ordinance, in requiring that plans and specifications of the premises showing conformity with the nonresidence building code of the
village as a precondition to obtaining the permit. Id. at 455-56, 136 N.E.2d at 494-95, 154
N.Y.S.2d at 24. The court interpreted the ordinance to mean that the board could only
attach conditions to the actual issuance of such a permit to ensure compliance. Id. The
court further held that the petitioner need not show the absence of a smaller, suitable alternative location, stating that size restrictions applied only to minimum requirements which
the petitioners already had met. Id. at 457, 136 N.E.2d at 495-96, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
'" The position of the Incorporated Village of Sands Point, an intervenor in the case, was
that the board should be viewed as having the authority under the ordinance to prevent the
erection of a church at a "precise spot." 1 N.Y.2d at 458, 136 N.E.2d at 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at
26. Although conceding that this would be a limitation on the construction of religious edifices, rather than an outright prohibition, see North Shore Unitarian Soc'y, Inc. v. Village of
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In another case, Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board,see decided
the same day, the court held that an adverse effect on property values,
potential tax revenue loss, decreased enjoyment of property and lack of
opportunity for future residential development were insufficient to justify
a denial of a building permit for a church and school. 01 The court stated
Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 525, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1951) (ordinance wholly excluding churches ruled impermissible as failing to "promote the health,
safety, morals or general welfare of the community"), the court reasoned that the unrestrained ability to determine that a particular location is improper is, in the final examination, a power to determine what location is in fact proper, 1 N.Y.2d at 458, 136 N.E.2d at
496, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 26. This, the court stated, "is the wrong solution." Id. The court observed that this construction of the statute would allow the board to interfere with the free
and unrestrained exercise of religious worship, and determined therefore that such an interpretation would not be countenanced. Id.
-oo 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956). In Diocese of Rochester, the
Rochester Diocese had entered a contract for the purchase of land to be used for the erection of a church and school located in a "Class A" residential district. Id. at 514, 136 N.E.2d
at 829-30, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The contract was conditioned upon obtaining a permit to
erect and use a church and school pursuant to a town zoning ordinance requiring planning
board approval. Id. After a public hearing, the permit was denied both by the planning
board and the board of appeals. Id. at 616-17, 136 N.E.2d at 830-31, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
This decision was affirmed by the town board. Two proceedings, later consolidated, were
commenced in which the Rochester Diocese alleged the unconstitutionality of the ordinance
and alleged further that there was an abuse of discretion by the board in its denial of the
permit. The diocese then sought to annul the board's determination and obtain an order
directing that a permit be issued. Id. at 517-18, 136 N.E.2d at 831, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
Both special term and the appellate division held that petitioner could not attack the ordinance's constitutionality since, in appealing the discretion of the board, petitioner assumed
the validity of the ordinance. Id. at 519, 136 N.E.2d at 832, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 856. But see
Temple Israel v. Plaut, 10 Misc. 2d 1084, 1091, 170 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1957). (Since the validity of the ordinance was to be determined as a matter of law,
subsequent decision that it was invalid meant petitioner had been "under no legal compulsion to seek a variance under the ordinance"; "it cannot be held that petitioner's participation in a proceeding to obtain relief that was not required deprives petitioner from its right
to the issuance of the permit.") Both special term and the appellate division, however,
found an adequate factual basis in the record to support the board's denial. 1 N.Y.2d at 519,
136 N.E.2d at 832, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
21 1 N.Y.2d at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863. The court first turned to the
threshold question of constitutionality, but found it unnecessary to decide the issue. Id. at
520, 136 N.E.2d at 833, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 857. The court stated that a statute constitutional
on its face may be construed and applied in an arbitrary, unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional manner. Id. at 521, 136 N.E.2d at 833, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 857. Significantly, the
court felt that allowing the possible adverse effect on property values to bar the establishment of a church would be to promulgate an "unauthorized standard" that would effectively
prevent any such establishment in a "Class A" zoned area. Id. at 524, 136 N.E.2d at 835, 154
N.Y.S.2d at 861. Moreover, the potential pecuniary loss to a few was far outweighed by the
high purposes and moral value the petitioner's efforts represented. Id. The court further
stated that a refusal based on loss of potential tax revenue would thwart the established
public policy that churches and schools are far more important than local taxes, as evidenced by the provisions of the New York State Constitution making such property tax
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that such a denial "bear[s] no substantial relation to the promotion of the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the 0community
[and is]
2
arbitrary and unreasonable and should be annulled.' '

The New York courts clearly require more than a mere rational basis
to circumscribe aspects of a sect's free exercise rights. 03 Indeed, in Diocese of Rochester, the very means most often invoked to justify imposition of zoning under the rational basis inquiry-diminished potential tax
revenue and enjoyment of property-were expressly termed insufficient
to deny a church the use of its property for religious activities. s 4 Apparently, such a result will also obtain when the questioned activities are not
exempt. Id. at 524-25, 136 N.E.2d at 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861. Finally, the court found that
the absence of churches or schools in a built-up area is an insufficient reason to deny a
permit, since this would contravene the intent of the ordinance by effectively forcing location of churches and schools in areas inadequately situated to serve the territorial needs of
the parish. Id.
Judge Van Voorhis dissented, arguing that the petitioner, in essence, had succeeded in
attacking the constitutional validity of the ordinance while simultaneously seeking benefits
thereunder. 1 N.Y.2d at 527, 136 N.E.2d at 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863. (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the zoning ordinance failed to set forth guidelines
for the board's decision, and that therefore its constitutionality was dubious. Id. (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). That question, the dissent argued, was of great significance and should
not have been "decided inferentially and summarily in this article 78 proceeding." Id. at
530, 136 N.E.2d at 839, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 526, 136 N.E.2d at 857, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (emphasis omitted). The court qualified its determination by stating that in a proper case, appropriate restrictions could be
placed upon school and church uses, and that such usage could be excluded from an area
given the proper circumstances. Id. The court required, however, that the state display a
substantial relation to the promotion of public welfare. Id. (emphasis added). A rational
basis, therefore, is apparently insufficient to sustain a New York administrative decision
which infringes upon the first amendment free exercise clause in the zoning context.
103 The New York Court of Appeals has recognized the "peculiarly pre-eminent status of
religious institutions under the First Amendment provision for free exercise of religion" and
that such must be balanced with the "needs or desires of a community." Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 342 N.E.2d
534, 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (1975). Although the court has recognized that "public
health, safety or welfare" are legitimate state interests, id. (citing Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 222 N.Y.2d 488, 496-97, 239 N.E.2d 891, 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 303-04
(1968)), and that "appropriate restrictions may . . . be imposed with respect to [religious
uses or] . .. [such may be] excluded from designated areafs]," Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d 827, 837, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 863 (1956), such restrictions, absent a substantial relation to those state interests, are "outweighed by the constitutional prohibition against the abridgment of the free exercise of religion by the public
benefit and welfare which is itself an attribute of religious worship in a community." Jewish
Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 39 N.Y.2d 283, 289,
342 N.E.2d 534, 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753 (1975).
so0 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 524-25, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849, 861 (1956).
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"customarily incident" to churches. 0 5
Although subjecting religious entities to health and safety regulations, the New York courts have held that a municipality must at least
show a "substantial relationship" to such concerns to justify the restriction of property use which intimately is connected with the functions of a
particular sect.'" Uses which have been upheld include a "factory" with
radio broadcasting equipment, printing and storage shops, a school,1'1 a
religious education center,20 8 and a day care center.'"9 The scope of "religious use" was even held, in Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center,'10 to include a drug rehabilitation center for nonhardcore users.
2" It is submitted that the court of appeals would apply a similar test for any religious use
and that the court has recognized a broad range of activities as falling within that category.
'" See note 202 supra.
"7 Faith For Today, Inc. v. Murdock, 11 App. Div. 2d 718, 719, 204 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (2d
Dep't 1960), affd, 9 N.Y.2d 761, 174 N.E.2d 743, 215 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
" Diocese of Cent. New York v. Schwarzer, 23 Misc. 2d 515, 519, 199 N.Y.S.2d 939, 944
(Sup. Ct. Madison County 1960) (application for a certificate of occupancy as a religious
education center wrongfully denied by allowing the "[niaked dictionary meaning of separate
words" of the ordinance "to distort intent" rather than "convey ... meaning"), aff'd, 13
App. Div. 2d 863, 217 N.Y.S.2d 567 (3d Dep't 1961).
',' Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 63 Misc. 2d 978, 982-83, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66, 7172 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970) (special use permit not necessary for a church to operate
a day care center on its premises). See also Temple Israel v. Plaut, 10 Misc. 2d 1084, 1090,
170 N.Y.S.2d 393, 398 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957) (construction of Temple extension
including gymnasium and pool held to be permissible as accessory use).
"30 66 Misc. 2d 312, 318, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 946 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971). In Slevin,
neighbors of the church brought suit to enjoin the church and local hospital from using the
third floor of the parish house as a drug center. The plaintiffs alleged that such use constituted a violation of the existing zoning law which permitted religious use of the property.
The center, operating under the supervision of medical and vocational professionals, was to
conduct activities such as therapy, school studies, drug education, and extensive counseling
of the patients. Id. at 313-14, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 941. The court recognized that the term
"religious use" has been broadly interpreted by the court of appeals but that "each case
ultimately rests upon its own facts." Id. at 317, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (quoting In re Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1956)). The court
held that the drug center program discharged the Episcopal Church's spiritual duty, and
also found that the sect's attempt to eliminate the drug problem was a profound and noteworthy function. 66 Misc. 2d at 317-19, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46. The court observed that
"[w]here the religious use may be so fraught with danger or peril to the community because
of the particular use sought, the detriment to the community can outweigh the religious
consideration." Id. at 320, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 947. It has been suggested, however, that where
the surrounding community does not suffer economic injury nor incur practical difficulties, a
religious organization may not be denied its constitutionally mandated free exercise of religion guaranteed by the Constitution. See Seaford Jewish Center, Inc. v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 48 App. Div. 2d 686, 686, 368 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (2d Dep't 1975); cf. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d
534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975) (religious use not denied where community inconveniences are
minor and can be alleviated by other means), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
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Clearly, the New York courts will not countenance an overly literal or
strictly construed statutory definition when the effect is to foreclose a religious organization from engaging in an appurtenant religious activity. In
Diocese of CentralNew York v. Schwarzer,"' the Diocese of Central New
York brought an Article 78 proceeding to secure the issuance of a certificate of occupancy in accordance with an application made to the zoning
ordinance enforcement officer of the town of Cazenovia, New York. The
diocese had purchased land in Cazenovia which previously had been occupied as a residence.2"" The diocese proposed to use the premises as a religious education center and planned to conduct a program of supervised
religious study, including seminars, contemplation, and training in Christian living and service.'1 8 It was established that the center and focus of
the premises would be a chapel.' Although the premises were located in
a residential use district, the applicable zoning ordinance permitted
churches or similar places of worship, parish houses, and public and parochial schools. 16 The diocese contended that its proposed use was permissible pursuant to the terms of the ordinance.2'" The zoning board of appeals denied the application, ruling that the chapel was not a church or
similar place of worship, but merely an adjunct to the diocese "conference
center."'1 7 Moreover, the zoning board observed that the chapel, as an
adjunct to the conference center, was not intended to serve the religious
needs of the residents of the town and, therefore, could not be characterized as a church."'8 With respect to the contention that the conference
center qualified as a school, the zoning board determined that the center
could not be so designated, since the ordinance did "not contemplate the
location of boarding schools or other types of educational institutions
where the students remain in residence overnight."' 9 Finally, the zoning
21' 23 Misc. 2d 515, 199 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1960), aff'd, 13 App. Div.
2d 863, 217 N.Y.S.2d 567 (3d Dep't 1961).
112 23 Misc. 2d at 516, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
"I Id. The proposed programs were to last from 1 to 7 days with participants numbering
from 20 to 50. Id.
1" Id. at 516-17, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42. Although a variety of activities were planned, such
as Holy Communion, discussion groups, and lectures, a representative of the diocese stated
at a public hearing that "' [ t~he center and focus ... as it always is in the Church, would be
in the Chapel.'" Id. at 516, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
'" Id. at 517, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
$16Id. at 518, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
217 Id.
at 517-18, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 942-43. The board of appeals recognized that the diocese
proposed to use the property for "religious activity" but maintained that the proposed "instrumentality" for the activity did not fall within the categories of church, parochial school,
or convent. Id.
Ild. at 518, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
'" Id. The board found that the uses contemplated were the "usual public school and the
usual parochial school. .. operated on a day basis." Id. The board reasoned that an over-
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board rejected the assertion by the diocese that the use qualified as a
convent, since the "quartering of laymen, including children, for brief
sojourns at a conference center" did not constitute a convent.""
Justice Zeller, in his review of the zoning board's findings, noted initially that merely because the diocese premises were not to be used exclusively as a church did not require a determination that the use was entirely impermissible."'s In addition, he observed that the ordinance
should be interpreted as a whole, 2 and that "naked dictionary meaning
of separate words" should not be interpreted so as to distort the intent of
the draftsmen.'" Significantly, Justice Zeller stated that the diocese's
proposed use should not be denied simply because its programs did "rot
exactly coincide with dictionary definitions of the uses enumerated by
4
the zoning ordinance.""12
Finally, Justice Zeller concluded that the pro-

posed use was within the intent of the ordinance-to permit places of
worship and to allow buildings for the purpose of religious fellowships,
study and education-and that the requested certificate of occupancy
should therefore be issued."'
In Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown,' an action was brought to
annul the determination of a planning commission requiring certain front
and side-yard setbacks in the proposed expansion of a temple. 2 7 In
Brown, the temple's proposed expansion plan provided for a setback of 62
feet from the building line and allowed 29 feet to the adjoining side lot."'
The planning commission, however, insisted upon a 130-foot setback and
a 40-foot expanse between the adjoining side lot."' The temple had com-

plied with all of the other mandates of the commission.3 0 The temple
argued that the setback and side-yard restrictions were arbitrary and capricious, bore no substantial relationship to the health and safety of the
night school was not "usual." Id.
'0 Id. Apparently, the board believed that a "convent" entailed greater continuity of residence. See id.
121 Id. at 519, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
222

Id.

2*3

Id.

Id. (emphasis added). Justice Zeller stated that "even under a strict and literal interpreI.
tation" the property could be used as a church, parochial school or parish house. Id.
225

Id.

22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
M2The Westchester Reform Temple owned a large tract of land on Mamaroneck Road, a
heavily traveled residential street in Scarsdale. Id. at 492, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d
at 300. In order to accommodate the increasing needs of its congregation, the temple sought
to expand its single-story facility. Id.
22 Id.
22 Id. The 130-foot setback requirement was arrived at by computing five times the proposed height of the building after the remodeling. Id.
226

230

Id.
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community, violated the federal and state constitutions, and imposed an
unnecessary $100,000 hardship on the temple.""' In his discussion, Judge
Keating noted that the court in prior decisions had indicated that facilities for religious or educational uses were by their very nature in furtherance of the general welfare.2" Moreover, it was observed by Judge Keating that criteria, sufficient to support denial of a building permit for a
commercial structure, have been held inadequate to prevent construction
of a church."' The court then indicated that in order to preclude the
construction of a church or synagogue, it must be shown convincingly
that the proposed use of the temple's structure will have a direct and
immediate adverse effect upon the health, safety or welfare of the community." 4 Notably, the court stated that considerations of traffic hazards
and injury to the neighborhood are outweighed by constitutional considerations. 23 The court then enunciated a principle of mutual accomoda"Id.

at 492-93, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 300-01.
Id. at 493, 239 N.E.2d at 894, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 301. Judge Keating reasoned that when
the religious requirements of the community have increased so as to require larger facilities,
the same rationale should be applied to the expansion as is applied to the original construction of such structures. Id.
233 Id. (citing Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834,
154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 859 (1956)).
234 22 N.Y.2d at 494, 239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 302 (emphasis supplied). The court
noted that at the planning commission hearings, there had been conflicting evidence
presented as to whether the proposed additions would detract from the property values or
appearance of the surrounding area. Id. at 494, 239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02.
The planning commission, however, found "that the proposed expansion ... will impair the
use, enjoyment and value of properties in the surrounding areas. . . and will deteriorate the
appearance of the area." Id., 239 N.E.2d at 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 302. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that even assuming the commission's findings to be correct, the reasons asserted
were still inadequate to support the prohibition of the contemplated expansion. Significantly, the court stated: "To sustain the Planning Commission's decision, it must be convincingly shown that the Temple's proposed expansion will have a direct and immediate
adverse effect upon the health, safety or welfare of the community." Id.; accord, Mikveh of
South Shore Cong., Inc. v. Granito, 78 App. Div. 2d 855, 855, 432 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (2d
Dep't 1980) (application for variance for ritual bath wrongfully denied on grounds of increased traffic and fire hazards); First Westminister Presbyterian Church v. City Council, 57
App. Div. 2d 556, 556, 393 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (2d Dep't 1977) (increased traffic hazards and
detriment to property values outweighed by constitutional considerations).
...22 N.Y.2d at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304; see note 184 supra. In addressing the question of whether the ordinance itself was unconstitutional, the court emphasized that "the power of regulation has not been altogether obliterated" when a community
deals with a proposed religious establishment. 22 N.Y.2d at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 303. Rather, these powers, though "severely curtailed," permit the municipality
to "minimize, insofar as possible, the impairment of surrounding areas or the danger of
traffic hazards." Id., 239 N.E.2d at 896, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04. The court stated that it had
not decided that such considerations were unrelated to the public well-being, but simply
that the constitutional protection afforded to free exercise of religion was paramount. Id.,
239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. Hence, if both interests could be reconciled, the
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tion, stating:
If the community can, consistent with this policy, both comply with the
constitutional requirement and, at the same time avoid or minimize, insofar
as practicable, traffic hazards or other potential detriments bearing a substantial relation to the health, safety and welfare of the community, there is
no barrier to its doing so.""

In Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v.Incorporated Village of
Roslyn Harbor,1s 7 a synagogue brought an action seeking to declare unconstitutional a village zoning ordinance requiring all structures for religious use to be set back at least 100 feet."'5 Further, the synagogue challenged as unconstitutional a special use ordinance which operated to deny
a permit to religious organizations if "any" detrimental effect on the public health, welfare or safety occurred.139In Reconstructionist Synagogue,
the plaintiff had purchased two adjacent lots and buildings in the village
of Roslyn Harbor. 4 0 An estate house in close proximity to neighboring
homeowners was to be used as a meeting place for services and as a guest
house for the congregation's rabbi.""1 The estate house was located some
29 feet from the property line; the applicable zoning ordinance required
all structures for religious use to be set back at least 100 feet. 2 The zoning board, although given authority to consider the suitability of a religious use, was not given the authority to vary the 100-foot setback recourt continued, there was certainly no obstacle to such a procedure. Id. at 496-97, 239
N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
236 Id. Since there was nothing objectionable per se with the standards promulgated by the
ordinance, the court held that, in and of itself, the ordinance was not unconstitutional. Id.
at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. Although the statute, in effect, directed the
planning board to accommodate, if possible, the interests of the community, id., the court
took pains to point out that the application of the ordinance by the commission in this case
was impermissible. See id. at 497, 239 N.E.2d at 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 304. In concluding, the
court noted that if the determination by the commission had required only a minor expenditure by the petitioners, it may have been acceptable, but that, in the present case, "the
heavy financial burden placed upon the Temple" rendered the commission's finding unacceptable. Id.
...38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d" 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975).
238 Id. at 286, 342 N.E.2d at 537, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
239 Id.
240 Id. The plaintiff, a religious corporation, had approximately 300 to 350 members. Id. at
285, 342 N.E.2d at 536, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 750. Until the time of the purchase, it had conducted services and education programs in various buildings belonging to other denominations. Id., 342 N.E.2d at 536, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 751. Its membership was drawn from a large
part of the surrounding area, with only about four percent of the members actually residing
in the village. Id. at 285-86, 342 N.E.2d at 536-37, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
" The original tract had been a large estate. Id. at 286, 342 N.E.2d at 537, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
751. In 1954, the parcel had been subdivided, and a number of lots were now occupied by
homeowners who objected to the nearness of the house of worship. Id.
242 Id.
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quirement. " Thus, when the synagogue applied for a special use permit
and for a variance, the variance was denied, and as a consequence, the
permit was denied. 2" Significantly, the zoning board indicated that, even
if the denial of the variance had not settled the dispute, the special use
permit nevertheless would have been denied by virtue of the synagogue's
potential effect upon traffic and because there was insufficient pressure in
24 5
nearby fire hydrants.
Judge Fuchsberg, writing for the majority, initially noted that the
special use ordinance permitted denial of the requested permit if any detrimental effect on traffic or safety was found.2 46 It was further observed
that neither ordinance contained any substantial requirements for accommodating or mitigating the detrimental effects of the proposed use." 7
Moreover, Judge Fuchsberg stated that the determinations made by the
board with respect to traffic and safety were not supported by sufficient
evidence, and that these determinations were not accompanied by any
efforts to mitigate the inconveniences allegedly caused by the use. 48 The
143

Id.

Id. The synagogue brought an action under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules to compel the approval of the requisite variance. Id. Since the court of appeals could
not, under Article 78, compel the board to grant a variance for which it lacked authority,
relief was sought in the form of a declaratory judgment that both ordinances were unconstitutional. Id.; see Independent Church of the Realization of the Word of God, Inc., v. Board
of Zoning Appeals, 81 App. Div. 2d 585, 586-87, 437 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (2d Dep't 1981)
(constitutional challenge improper under Article 78 proceeding).
I'l 38 N.Y.2d at 286, 342 N.E.2d at 537, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
1'6 Id. at 289, 342 N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 753-54 (emphasis added).
147 Id. The court distinguished the ordinances from those upheld in Westchester
Reform
Temple. There, the ordinances required the board to "avoid or minimize 'insofar as practicable'" the negative effects a religious institution might have on a community. Id., 342
N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 754 (emphasis omitted). In the case at bar, however, the
special use ordinance required that the permit be denied upon the finding of any interference with traffic or safety, while the variance ordinance provided for no possibility of mitigating the 100-foot setback requirement. Id. (emphasis added). It was this inflexibility, the
court reasoned, that "offends against the requirement that efforts to accommodate religious
uses be made." Id. The court noted that it was certainly conceivable that a situation might
arise where a setback of less than 100 feet might entail no detriment to the public welfare.
Id.
"0'Id. at 289-90, 342 N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 754. The court made it clear that even
if the ordinances in question had been adjudged constitutional, the board's application of
them was improper. Id. While recognizing that the failure to produce substantial evidence of
the anticipated inconveniences and the lack of any attempt to alleviate the problem short of
outright refusal of the variance probably resulted from the broad scope of the ordinances,
the court refused to simply remand the case for reconsideration of whether the setback
involved was acceptable. "[Tihe question which the village must answer is not whether 29
feet is reasonable but rather, what reasonable measures can be taken to mitigate the effect
upon the neighbors of having a synagogue 29 feet from the property line." Id. at 290, 342
N.E.2d at 539, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
244
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court thus held that the zoning laws in question were unconstitutional.2 4 9
Perhaps the most far-reaching New York assessment of the free exercise considerations implicated when zoning unfavorably affects religious
organizations occurred in American Friends of the Society of St. Pious v.
Schwab.'50 In Schwab, the Appellate Division, Second Department, faced
the question of whether a local zoning power may bar completely a religious organization from using its property for church purposes in an area
zoned for residential use.25 1 In Schwab, the petitioning religious organization was denied permission, by the Oyster Bay Cove Board of Trustees, to
2 52
use certain of its real property as a church and residence for priests.
Special term had annulled the board's determination and remitted the
matter, directing that the board grant petitioner's application under circumstances that would both facilitate establishment of the church and
mitigate the adverse effects of the use upon the community. 25 3 On appeal,
the appellate division affirmed."" Justice Shapiro, writing for the majorId. at 291, 342 N.E.2d at 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756. In a concurring opinion, Judge Breitel
agreed with the majority's conclusion, but argued that the Court's language was "too absolutist." Id. (Breitel, J., concurring). "Fundamentally, the law should move in the direction of
requiring even religious institutions to accommodate to factors directly relevant to public
health, safety, or welfare." Id. at 291, 342 N.E.2d at 540-41, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (Breitel, J.,
concurring). Judge Breitel concurred in the result because the overall effect of the ordinances as they stood did not accede to the "limited" priorities that should be afforded religious institutions. Id. at 292, 342 N.E.2d at 541, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Breitel, J.,
concurring).
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jones posited that the case presented a suitable example
of circumstances under which a religious institution could be restricted or excluded. Id.
(Jones, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the plaintiff was a newcomer to the
community, that it had purchased the property with full knowledge of the zoning restrictions, and that it was predominantly to serve members of other communities outside the
village. Id. at 294-95, 342 N.E.2d at 542-43, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Jones, J., dissenting). The
dissent also indicated that the establishment of the synagogue would entail difficulties with
respect to traffic and safety in the community, and argued that, in this case, "a reasonable
relationship" existed between the ordinances and the public health, safety and welfare. Id.
at 295, 342 N.E.2d at 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Jones, J., dissenting). The dissent urged the
court to free itself of its "continued slavish adherence to the outmoded doctrine that
churches and synagogues are wholly immune from even reasonable zoning regulation." Id.,
342 N.E.2d at 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Jones, J., dissenting).
250 68 App. Div. 2d 646, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1979). "" Id. at 648, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
22 Id. The petitioner owned a 2-acre lot in an area zoned exclusively as residential. Id. The
parcel was situated at the end of a private road approximately 1/2mile from the nearest
private road. Id. The nearby property owners objected to the proposed use of the parcel,
claiming that the church and the resultant traffic would decrease property values, create a
fire hazard, adversely affect the health, safety and welfare of the village denizens, and that,
in any case, the site was inappropriate for a church. Id.
249

222 Id.

at 647-48, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 992.

Id. at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
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ity, noted initially that the court of appeals in Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown 2" had declared that a community, faced with a conflict between the constitutional duty not to abridge the free exercise of religion
and the need to protect the public health, safety and welfare, should accommodate both interests."' Significantly, Justice Shapiro indicated that
in reviewing the determination of the board, it was necessary to "most
carefully scrutinize" the reasons advanced for the denial in order to "insure that they are real and not merely pretexts used to preclude the exercise of constitutionally protected privileges."2 5 7 Additionally, Justice Shapiro cautioned that the zoning power may not be used to deny the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion by a "chilling application" of the zoning law. "5 The court thus recognized that the application
of a standard of review requiring anything less than a "most careful scrutiny" of such a determination affords zoning entities a power to infringe
upon religious practices which is inconsistent with the free exercise
clause. " 9 The Schwab result clearly represents one of the more decisive
2- 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968).
25 68 App. Div. 2d at 648-49, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 992-93.
28 Id.
at 649, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 993. The court noted that public officials, when confronted
with community pressure to prevent the intrusion of religious edifices in a residential area,
often mask the true grounds of their decisions by citing concerns of increased traffic or fire
hazards. Id. Hence, the court suggested that careful examination was in order to protect the
constitutional rights involved. Id. The grounds actually cited by the appellants included
increased traffic hazards, impermissible ground coverage, and drainage, sewage and access
problems. The court, however, pointed out that the petitioner had offered to comply with all
applicable safety standards, and intimated that the predominant factor in the appellant's
decision had been possible disturbance and annoyance to area residents. Id. at 650, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 994. Continuing, the court stated that their decision did not require that irreconcilable difficulties between the parties be resolved in favor of the church, but rather, was a
simple remand requiring the appellant to fashion a reasonable compromise. Id. at 650-51,
417 N.Y.S.2d at 994. The court considered it premature to address the question of primacy
in the event of an irreconcilable difference, when in fact no such impasse had been demonstrated. Id. at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
Justice Suozzi dissented, arguing that the judgment should be modified so as to provide
that should an irreconcilable difference arise between the church and the village, the church
must adhere to the zoning requirements. Id. at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). He argued that by affirming the lower court judgment, the majority had implicitly
endorsed the view that any irreconcilable conflict must be resolved in favor of the petitioning religious organization. Id. at 652, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). The
dissent contended that the court of appeals had moved toward the view that "legitimate and
serious considerations of public health, safety and welfare, i.e., fire and similar emergency
risks, and traffic conditions insofar as they involve public safety . . . outweigh any policy
favoring religious structures." Id. at 652, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 651, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
,59 Id. The court cautioned against permitting the limitation of "the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion by using the local zoning power as a free-wheeling excuse
to exclude places of religious worship from their neighborhoods." Id.

27

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING

1982

applications of the free exercise clause within the zoning context.
The New York view, it is submitted, represents a viable and constitutional approach, which both provides ample opportunity for states to
safeguard their citizens' health, welfare, and morals, and properly acknowledges the first amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of
religion.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing cases illustrate the wide range of opinion expressed
throughout the judicial system with respect to what constitutes a religious
use for zoning law purposes, and the standard of review applicable to that
determination. Many tribunals have narrowly construed the scope of the
free exercise clause and have sought to resolve the question of whether a
particular activity qualifies as a permissible religious use without recognizing the constitutional dimensions of their determination. The decision
by a court or zoning authority that a particular religious activity is not
within a traditionally accepted definition of religion often has ended the
inquiry into the permissibility of the questioned practice. It is submitted
that this approach is both unworkable and overly restrictive in a constitutional sense. The religions which exist in our society are extremely diverse, and their practices often are not susceptible of precise categorization. Further, a rigid application of the "definitional approach"
necessarily proscribes the appurtenant practices of those sects whose activities are not the type traditionally perceived as incident to the operation of a church. Indeed, a parochial or overly literal interpretation of
zoning language may permit local authorities completely to foreclose religious organizations from engaging in certain activities. Clearly, the promise of religious freedom is an empty one if the activities of a sect are
circumscribed by a narrow perception of what constitutes a religious use
for zoning purposes.
The Supreme Court often has indicated that the absolute proscription against state interference with pure religious belief may not be invoked to forestall regulation of conduct motivated by religious belief.
This has not meant, however, that within the realm of permissible regulation, restrictions may be imposed without consideration of their effect
upon the protected aspects of the regulated action. In Sherbert v. Verner,
a case in which the burden imposed upon religious exercise was concededly indirect, the Supreme Court required that constraints upon religious
exercise represent the least restrictive means of attaining the legitimate
state end. Undoubtedly, the erection or use of a structure by a religious
organization to facilitate practice of its beliefs represents conduct properly the subject of state zoning regulations. It is submitted, however, that
there exist sufficiently compelling free exercise considerations within such
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a context to implicate the enhanced protections afforded religious exercise by the Supreme Court in Sherbert and later in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
It is suggested, therefore, that a constitutional standard be established
with respect to zoning violative of the free exercise of religion. Such a
standard would mandate a heightened deference to the guarantees of the
free exercise clause. Rather than attempting to ascertain whether a particular use falls within the statutory definition of "church" or "accessory
use," the courts should use the sincerity of the religious sect's belief in
the questioned practice as the basis for determining whether the use is
"religious" and thus a permissible use or accessory activity. Once it is
determined that a sincere, nonfraudulent belief exists, the court or zoning
authority would engage in a balancing process, assessing the merits of the
objections asserted and then, if necessary, imposing regulations designed
to mitigate the undesirable effects of the use. When traffic congestion,
noise, parking questions and other clearly noncompelling considerations
are the principal objections to a religious use, a zoning authority should
be required to exhaust all available means of mitigating the identified
detrimental effects before making any outright denial of permission to
engage in the use. In the event that an irreconcilable conflict arises between such considerations and a sect's desire to engage in a use intimately related to its religious mission, a compelling interest should be
established as a prerequisite to the enforcement of the ordinance. Further, the state should be required to establish a compelling interest in any
zoning law which significantly infringes upon a practice intimately related
to the religious mission of a sect. Finally, municipal zoning authorities
always should be required to employ the least restrictive means available
in order to effectuate their interests in attaining a specific legitimate purpose. The application of these criteria, it is submitted, would not only
preserve the vitality of a right which figures prominently in the lexicon of
our constitutionally protected liberties, but would also accommodate the
states' interest in regulating potentially destructive or harmful practices.
Various jurisdictions have adopted an approach which requires an increased judicial deference to the free exercise clause when zoning and the
practices of religious entities conflict. Although no case has reached the
Supreme Court in which such a question has been presented, it is hoped
that the Court will mandate careful consideration of the free exercise issues often implicated when zoning laws impact unfavorably upon the
practices of religious organizations.

